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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rapid advance of all aspects of computer technology has enable the computer
service market to expand at a blistering pace. The first programmable computers were
run by bulky vacuum tubes, consumed large amount of energy and generated substantial
heat and thus often filled one or more rooms. Those computers were found only at large
corporations, research institutions and government agencies. Nevertheless, with the
development of semiconductor chip (integrated circuit containing a large amount of
transistors), "the size of computers decreased while their computing power increased""*
and now, computers are present in a substantial portion of American homes. At the same
time as computer market developed, the software sector also expanded rapidly and now it
offers a wide variety of service and product.
Like other intellectual creations, software need to be protected. In effect, without
specific legal protection, the appropriation by others cannot be prevented and this would
resuh in a market failure leading to reduce capital investment in software production,
economic inefficiency and unfairness which can and should be corrected by specific legal
protection. Then, as one of the latest in a series of technological innovations including
' Robert P. Merges. Peter S. Menell. Mark A. Lemley & Thomas M. Jorde. Intellectual Property' in the
New Technological Age 844 (1997).
-See id at 831.
^ See id.
2photography, phonogram record, radio and television broadcasting, software should be
protected by copyright law.
Copyright is a body of legal rights that protects the works of authors, artists and
composers from being reproduced. Then the author of a copyrighted work has some
exclusive rights on the protected work. The first copyright law was the Statute of Anne"*
enacted in 1710 by the British padiament. Before this Statute, copyright was perpetual
but the Statute of Anne provided a limited term copyright. It was limited to two terms of
fourteen years each. But the second term was available to the author only if he or she was
still living at the end of the first term. After that, the work felt in what we call today "the
public domain". The main objective of this statute was to destroy the historic monopoly
of stationers.
In the United States, the Framers of the Constitution recognized the need to
protect authors and to encourage creativity. The result was article 1, section 8, clause 8
of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have the Power ... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useftil Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries". This provision gave the
federal government the power to enact copyright and patent statutes. Congress passed the
first American copyright law in 1790. Since then, copyright has been revised a few times.
A major revision was made in 1909 and in 1976. The 1976 act^ is the actual legal basis for
copyright protection in the United States.
At the time of its enactment, the 1976 Act reserved the question of whether
software were copyrightable. The computer copyright problem first came under serious
study in the United States when the Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) was set up in 1974 to consider problems of new
technology relating to computers and photocopying. As a result of its study^, CONTU
"* Statute of Anne. 8 Anne C. 19 (1710).
-' 17U.S.C.$$ 101-803(1976).
^ National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted works. Final report (1979).
3concluded that copyright protection, as opposed to other traditional intellectual property
protections, was more appropriate for software and recommended that computer
programs be specifically included in the statutory language.
The CONTU's recommendation led to the enactment of the Computer Software
Copyright Act of 1980^, which recognizes that, as a general principle, software programs
are copyrightable as literary work. Congress added section 1 17 regarding permissible use
of computer programs as well as adding a definition of computer program to section 1 1
of the copyrighted Act. Section 101 of the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Act defines a
computer program as "... a set of statements or instruction to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain resuh".
The copyright protection of software creates problems because not everybody
agrees about the necessity and adequacy of such a protection. There are numbers of
advantages to copyright, which explain its emergence as the protection of choice. It may
be obtained rapidly, it is inexpensive, there are few formalities and the protection is of long
duration (in general it subsists fi'om its creation and endures for a term consisting of the
life of the author and fifty years after the author's death).
But copyright protection also has drawbacks. A group of commentators has
concluded that Congress may have acted unwisely in protecting software within the
framework of the copyright Act.^ They argue that software in machine-readable form are
utilitarian in ftmction and thus are outside the scope of copyright law.^ Furthermore,
allowing a wide copyright protection to software would bestow strong monopolies upon
those who develop operating systems that become industry standards. It would inhibit
Pub. L. 96-517(1980).
^ Samuelson. CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Cop> right Protection for Computer Programs in
Machine-Readable Form. 1984 DUKE L.J. 663: Samuelson. Creating a Ne« Kind of Intellectual Propert>:
Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs. 70 MINN. L. Re\. 471 (1985). See also
Kidwell. Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We Confused*^ 70 MINN. L. Re\. 533 (1985); Brown.
Eligibilit\ for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards. 70 MINN. L. Rev. 579 (1985).
^ The copyright Act of 1976. Section 102 (b) excludes protection of "an) idea, procedure, process. s>stem.
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . regardless of the form in w hich it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work".
4Other creators from developing improved programs Moreover, the unsettled state of the
law regarding copyright protection for non-literal element of software also creates a quasi-
monopoly for the copyright owner. In effect, competitors are discouraged from creating
competing products out of fear of infringement suit '" Nevertheless, this paper will
analyze the scope of software copyright and will clarify the location of the line between
copyrightable expression of computer programs and the uncopyrightable processes that
they implement. Thus it will deny the critics against copyright protection of software
The first part of this paper deals with the applicability of copyright law. It explains
how software can be classified as literary work and analyzes which portion of the software
is copyrightable. The second part analyzes the scope of copyright protection of software.
It explains whether of not copyright protection extends to literal elements and non-literal
elements of software. Then, the third part discusses whether or not some uses of the
protected software are an infringement or not and the fourth part presents an overview of
new statutory protection for owners and users of the software. Finally, the fifth part
presents an overview of another form of protection for software and the sixth part deals
with the international copyright protection of software.
"' David M. Maiorana. Privileged Use: Has Judge Boudin suggested a viable means of copyright
protection for the non-literal aspects of computer softv\are in Lotus De\ elopment Corp. V. Borland
International"'. 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 149 (1996).
CHAPTER II
APPLICABILITY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A - Condition for copyright protection
Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act provides that "Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, fi"om which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device....". Thus the Copyright Act establishes two fundamental prerequisites for
copyright protection: originality and fixation. Therefore, software must fit into those
conditions to be held copyrightable.
Software can be stored on a variety of memory devices: a random access
memory' ' (RAM), a read only memory'^(ROM), or a data storage memory as a diskette or
"floppy disk"''. It is important to examine first whether those memory devices are seen as
tangible medium of expression and thus if copyright can exist in computer program
embedded on those.
'
' A RAM acts as temporar> storage de\ice for programs and data currently "running" on the computer
and it also ser%'es as permanent memory for data or programs.
' A ROM is an internal permanent memon. de\ice consisting of semiconductor chip which is
incorporated into the circuitr> of the computer.
'^ A floppy disk is an aa\iliar\ memon de\ice consisting of a flexible magnetic disk resembling a
phonograph record, which can be inserted into the computer and from which data or instructions can be
read.
6In Apple Computer, Inc v. Frank/in Computer Corporation^^, the court held that
the statutory' requirement of "fixation" was satisfied through the embodiment of the
expression in the ROM device. Therefore, the court reaffirmed the issue of the William
case that computer program in object code embedded on a ROM chip is an appropriate
subject of copyright.'^ A few years after, in Mai Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer,
Inc^^, the court held that the copy created in the RAM is "sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration".'^ Considering the language used in section 101 of the Copyright
Act'*, a copy made in RAM is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression.
Therefore, according to prior cases, software stored on a memorv device is fixed
and thus fills up the first condition for copyright protection.
The second prerequisite for copyright protection is originality The concept of
"original work of authorship" found in section 102(a) of the 1976 Act is purposely left
undefined because it "is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality
established by the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not
include requirement of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to
enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them".'^ The courts developed
two aspects of originality: independent creation by the author and a modest quantum of
creativity. ^° Concerning the protection of software, in Apple Computer, Inc v Franklin
Computer Corporation, the court found that there was a sufficient "modicum of
"714F.2d 1240(3dCir. 1983).
" Williams Electronics. Inc. v. Artie International. Inc.. 685 F.2d 870. 874 (3d Cir. 1982).
'*991F.2d 511 (1993).
''id at 518.
'* 17 U.S.C. $ 101 (1976) provides that " a work is "fi.xed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord. by or under the authorit> of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be percei\ ed. reproduced, or oiherv\ ise communicated for a period of more than
transitoPt duration."
'^ 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669. 5664.
"" See Harper & Row. Publishers. Inc v. Nation Enterprises. 471 U.S. 539. 547-49 (1985): "original, as
the term is used in copyright, means onl> that the \\ork was independenth created b> the author and that
it possesses at least some minimal degree of creauvit>..."
7creativity" in a computer program in object code to satisfy the statutory requirement of an
original worlc.'
The second sentence of section 102(a) of the 1976 Act lists seven broad categories
which the concept of "work of authorship" is said to included' The term "include" used in
section 102(a) means that the list is illustrative and not limitative.^' Thus the "seven
categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of "original work of authorship ' that the
bill is intended to protect".
'^"^
The copyright Act of 1976 did not mention computer program explicitly.
Nevertheless, Congress intended to include computer program in the term "literary
works". "^ In effect, the term literary work does not connote any criterion of literary merit
or qualitative value. '^^ Moreover, the definition of "literary works" includes expression
not only in words but section 101 of the copyright Act defines literary works as "works,
other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied". ^^ To clarify any ambiguity, in 1980, Congress amended section 101 of the
copyright Act to include computer program explicitly.
Thus, as has been shown, a computer program, if original, is protectable by
copyright law as a literary work which is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
However, like other works of authorship, computer programs, even if certain elements of
-' 714F.2d 1240. 1246(1983).
"" 17 U.S.C. $ 102(a) (1976) provides that "...works of authorship include the following categories:
literar> works: musical works, including am accompanying words: dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; pantomimes and choregraphic \\orks: pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
motion pictures and other audio\isual works; sound recordings: and architectural uorks".
-^ 17 U.S.C. $ 101 (1976).
-^ 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 5666.
"" 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 5667 "The term iiterar> works" ... includes .... computer programs to the
e.xteni that they incoporate authorship in the programmer" s e.xpression of original ideas, as distinguished
from the ideas themselves"".
-^ See id.
-' 17 U.S.C. $ 101(1976).
8them are copyrightable, are not entitled to an unlimited scope of copyright protection It
is thus important to examine which portion of the program is copyrightable.
B - The copyrightable portion of software
Copyright protection extends to the expression of an idea but not to the underlying
idea. Consequently, the courts had to create tests to differentiate, in a computer program,
between the idea and the expression of that idea.
1 - The idea / expression dichotomy
The basic point of the idea/expression dichotomy is that copyright protects the
expression of an idea but not the idea itself Congress adopted this principle from the
famous Baker v. Selden case^^. In that case, the copyrighted material was a book, written
by Selden, describing a particular accounting method. The allegedly infringing work was a
book describing the same accounting method and differed only in the organization of
columns and in the headings that described each column. The Supreme Court held that
only the expression describing the accounting method could be protected and not the
embodiments of ideas useflil for practicing the accounting method. '^'^ In doing so, the
court created the dichotomy between idea and expression.
The copyright Act of 1976 incorporated the dichotomy created in the Baker case.
Section 102(b) provides that "in no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work"." Therefore, once an author has revealed his work
to the public, only his innovative expression is eligible for copyright protection, and the
ideas contained in the work are injected into the public domain.
-** 101 U.S 99(1880).
-'Id at 103.
*' 17U.S.C. $ 102(b) (1976).
9As has been shown, the 1976 Act places computer software within the class of
copyrightable work.' Nevertheless, only the original expression within computer
software is protectible. Congress said that section 102(b) was intended "to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer
program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within
the scope of the copyright law".''
Unfortunately, it is difficult to differentiate the method or the process from their
expression in software. Therefore, a line must be drawn between ideas and the software's
expression of those ideas to establish which portion of the software is copyrightable. Over
the years, the courts had applied different standards or tests to distinguish idea from
expression.
2 - The tests to separate ideafrom expression
As will be explained in the next chapter, courts have remained consistent regarding
the literal aspects"' of a computer program, which obtain protection under traditional
copyright law as "literary works". Nevertheless, courts have had a problem in deciding
whether copyright law also covers non-literal aspects' of computer programs.
The first important case to define a test for the copyrightability of non-literal
elements of software is Whelau Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc'^ In
that case, Whelan wrote a program called Dentalab for Jaslow Laboratory to manage and
organize its dental laboratory records.' Later, Jaslow developed a similar program on his
own. Whelan Associates filed a suit for copyright infringement because Jaslow' s program
was based on its program."'
^' 17U.S.C. $ 101 (1988).
^- H.R.Rep. No. 1476. 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 54. repnnted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659.
5670(1976).
^'
It is used to refer to the literal program in object code or source code.
^^
It refers to the structure, sequence and organization of the soft\\ are and its user interface.
^-' 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
^Md at 1225-26.
^'
Id at 1227.
10
The district court did not find any copying of the source or object code
Nevertheless, after noting that copyright protection extends beyond the literal aspects of a
computer program'*, the court held that "the Dentalab copyright was infringed because
the overall structure of Dentcom (Jaslow's program) was substantially similar to the
overall structure of Dentalab"."'
The third circuit affirmed the district court decision. The court said that copyright
law protects the manner in which the author expresses an idea or concept, but not the idea
itself"*'^ Then, the court held that the purpose or function of a program is its idea"*' and
"the expression of the idea in a software computer program is the manner in which the
program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling,
calculating, retaining, correlating and producing useftil information either on a screen,
print-out or by radio communication"."* Therefore, the idea/expression test used by the
third circuit in the case at hand is that everything that is not part of the program's purpose
is an expression protectable by copyright law.
Nevertheless, the Whelan's standard for distinguishing idea fi"om expression has
been widely criticized for being conceptually overbroad. In effect, the "crucial flaw in
Whelan's reasoning is that it assumes that only one 'idea', in copyright law terms,
underlies any computer program, and that once a separable idea can be identified,
everything else must be expression"."*" However, there are typically many ideas expressed
in a computer program, including an overall idea and many sub-ideas."*"* Thus, "Whelan's
general formulation that the program's overall purpose equates with the program's idea is
descriptively inadequate"."*^
^^ Whelan. 797 F.2d at 1233.
^'Id.
^" Id at 1238.
^' Id at 1235.
'-Id at 1239.
""^ Computer Associates International. Inc. v. Altai. Inc.. 982 F.2d 693. 705 (2d Cir. 1992).
''Id.
''
Id.
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A few years later, in Lotus Development Corporation v. Paperback Sofmare
Internationaf^ , the court enunciated a three-step process for identifying copyrightable
subject matter This case concerns two competing application programs^^: "lotus 1-2-3"
and "'VT-Planner'". Lotus brought suit against Paperback Software International alleging
that Paperback's spreadsheet "VP-Planner" infringed Lotus' spreadsheet "1-2-3".
The court enunciated a three-step test to determine the copyrightability of the non-
literal aspects of a computer program. The first step is to apply an abstraction scale in
determining copyrightability.'*'* That is to say that the first step is "to conceive and define
the idea in a way that places it somewhere along the scale of abstraction (somewhere
between the most abstract and the most specific of all possible conceptions)","*'^ In other
words, first of all, the court must determine a program's idea and distinguish it from the
program's expression of that idea. In the second step, "the decisionmaker must focus
upon whether an alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to
expression of that idea or instead included identifiable elements of expression not essential
to every expression of that idea".^^ In other words, the court must determine if the
elements of a program's expression are essential to the expression of the idea or if they are
"one of only a few ways of expressing the idea". ^ Finally in the third step, after "having
identified elements of expression not essential to every expression of the idea"^", the court
must decide whether the elements of expression that are essential to the idea are "a
substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable work".^'
Judge Keeton wrote the majority opinion in the case at hand. .After applying to "1-
2-3" the legal test stated above. Judge Keeton found first that both programs "expressed
"" 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
^ Application programs are programs that permit a user to perform some particular task such as work
processing, database management, or speadsheet calculations, or that permit a user to play video games.
^* Paperback. 740 F. Supp. at 60.
''Id at 61.
'"
Id.
^'
Id.
^-
Id.
^^
Id.
12
the idea of an electronic spreadsheet" * Then Judge Keeton noted that the "rotated L"
layout of the spreadsheet and the slash key C*/"), used to invoke the menu command
system, were both "expressive elements that merge with the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet"^' and were not copyrightable. Nevertheless. Judge Keeton noted that "the
fact that some of these specific command terms ... merge with the idea of such a particular
command term does not preclude copyrightability for the command structure taken as a
whole". ^^ .After saying that. Judge Keeton concluded that "the menu structure taken as a
whole, ... is an aspect of '1-2-3' that is not present in every expression of an electronic
spreadsheet"." Therefore, "1-2-3" met the "requirements of the second element of the
legal test for copyrightability".^^ Finally, Judge Keeton considered that Lotus's menu
command structure is "the aspect that has made '1-2-3' so popular".'^ And thus decided
that "1-2-3" met the third step of his test. Taking account of all three elements of the
legal test for copyrightability, the court held that Lotus's menu command structure was
copyrightable.
Unfortunately, the Paperback's decision can be criticized. In effect, as did the
third circuit in Whe/an, the court in Paperback held that a computer program embodies
only one idea and that all other elements of a program are expression of that idea.
After the Paperback case, the second circuit rejected the notion that a program
can consist of only one idea, and it formulated a new test for determining copyrightability
in Computer Associates hiteruational, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.^ In that case. Computer
Associates (CA) wrote a job scheduling program called "CA-Scheduler". This program
contained a sub-program ("Adapter") which served as a translator. Altai also sold its own
job scheduling program and hired a former CA employee to rewrite Altai's program so
""'
Paperback. 740 F. Supp. at 66.
^^
Id.
'"
Id at 67.
'"
Id at 68.
'*
Id.
^'Id.
*' 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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that it could be run in conjunction with an M\'S operating system^' .AJtai, thus,
developed interface "OSC.\R 3 4", about thirty percent of which was copied from
"Adapter". CA found out about the copying and sued Altai. Altai claimed that it learned
for the first time of the copying when the suit was filed Then Altai's programmers
completely rewrote the copied portions of the interface resulting in "OSCAR 3.5" .Altai
shipped the new interface to new customers and all customers that had previously
purchased "OSC.\R 3 4"."
The Computer Associates ' court embarked on a new methodology for evaluating
infringement and announced a three-step test called "abstraction-filtration-comparison"
(AFC). In the first step, "abstraction", the court "should dissect the allegedly copied
program's structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it".^' In other
words, the program must be broken down into its constituent structural parts.^ In the
next step, "filtration", the court must examine:
"the structural components at each level of abstraction to determine whether their
particular inclusion at that level was "idea" or was dictated by consideration of
efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors
external to the program itself, of taken from the public domain and hence is
nonprotectable expression".
In other words, the court must examine the constituent parts of the computer program and
sift out all unprotectable material (ideas and elements dictated by efficiency or external
factors, or taken from the public domain). Finally, in the third step, "comparison", the
court compares any elements found to be protected in the fihration step to the structure of
the allegedly infringing program. ^^ If any elements of the infiinging program are
^' In a computer program, a compatibilit> component or interface is necessary to translate the requests
recei\ed from the task specific portion of the program into the appropriate s>stem call that will be
recognized by ^\hate^er operating s>stem is installed on the computer, e.g.. DOS/VSE. MVS or CMS.
^- Computer Associates. 982 F.2d at 700.
" Id at 707.
"^ Id at 706.
^- Id at 707.
'^ Id at 710.
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substantially similar to the protected elements of the original program, then a finding of
infringement is warranted. ^^ The second circuit applied the AFC test and affirmed the
judgment of the district court's decision that "'OSCAR 3.5" does not infringe CAs
copyright.
The Altai test, however, has been criticized. By breaking the program down into
smaller parts, the court fails to see the overall view of the program. In effect, "the
abstraction test creates risk of eliminating protection for combination of program's
individual elements".^* Moreover, the AFC test is difficult to apply because identifying the
individual elements of a computer can be problematic.^^
Notwithstanding the criticisms made at the .AFC test, it has been used by other
courts. Soon after issuance of Computer Associates, the middle district of Georgia
applied the AFC test because the court finds that "the test is well-grounded in traditional
concepts of copyright law and takes the unique nature of computer programs into
consideration".^" Now, the AFC test had been adopted in other circuits^ ^ and is routinely
applied by district courts.
^^
Recently, in Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International Inc.^'\ the
court declined the invitation to apply the AFC test used in Computer Associates. In effect,
the court thought the test "may provide a useful framework" for analyzing non-literal
infringements but here the court faced an admitted literal infringement.'"*
In the Borland case, Lotus alleged that Borland had copied the words and
arrangement of the Lotus menu command hierarchy to its program. Nevertheless, the first
^' Computer Associates. 982 F.2d at 706.
^ Aram Dobalian. Copyright Protection for Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs: The Need for
Compulson Licensing. 15 WhitlierL. Rev. 1019. 1064 (1994).
^' Id at 1057.
'" CMAX/Cleveland Inc.. d/b/a Computermax v. UCR. Inc.. 804 F.2d 337 (M..Ga. 1992).
' Bateman v. Mnemonics. Inc.. 79 F.3d 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
" Control Data Sys.. Inc. \. Infoware. Inc.. 903 F.Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1995); Producti\it> Software
Int'l. Inc. v. Healthcare Technologies. Inc.. 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
"M9F.3d807(lstCir. 1995).
'Id at 815.
15
circuit held that the "Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of
operation'"/' The court defined a method of operation as "the means by which a person
operates something, whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer".'^ Thus, the
court held that Borland did not infringe Lotus's copyright by copying it Then the
Supreme Court granted certiorari only three days after hearing oral arguments/' The
court affirmed the first circuit's decision four-to-four. Thus, the decision could express
neither approval, nor disapproval of the first circuit's decision, it merely means that the
decision stands.
Nevertheless, "the 'method of operation' analysis extends beyond the menu
hierarchy to any 'feature' of software that 'controls' the computer's operation (command
buttons, text boxes, icons etc.)". Therefore, under this analysis, anybody could create an
operating system using the exact same menu commands, windows and features used in
another operating system without worrying about a copyright infiingement suit.
In conclusion, "structure probably requires the application of the AFC test".^^ But
whether to know if the AFC test should also applied to literal infringement, the recent
Supreme Court's non-decision in Borland "confirmed that reasonable minds can differ on
these very difficult issues"^" and does not allow us to anticipate the fijture.
"'Borland. 49 F.3d at 815.
"'^Id.
" 133 L.Ed.2d 610 (1996).
^ Bruce G. Joseph and David A. Vogel. Cop>Tight Protection of Software and Compilations a Review of
Critical Developements 1991-1996. 441 PLI/Pat 369. 425 (1996).
''
Id at 427.
*" Id at 425.
CHAPTER III
SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OFSOFTWARE
"Simply because something is copyrightable does not mean that it is entitled to
copyright protection."^' The following chapter examines various elements of software,
both literal and non-literal, and explains whether these elements are entitled to copyright
protection,
A - Protection of literal elements
/ - object code
An object code or object program is a "program written in machine language that
can be executed directly by the computer's CPU ' without need for translation". ' An
object program is a concatenation of one and zeroes and is readable only by computer.*"*
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation^^ , the district court
expressed uncertainty as to whether a computer program in object code is protectable by
copyright law because it can not be communicated to individuals. The district court
questioned "whether copyright was to be limited to works designed to be
^' Bateman V. Mnemonics. Inc.. 79 F.3d 1532. 1547 (11th Cir. 1996).
^" The Central Processing Unit ("CPIT) contains the electronic circuits that control the computer and
perform the arithmetic and logical functions.
*^ Lotus De\elopment Corporation \
.
Paperback software International. 740 F. Supp. 37. 44 (1990).
*' Bateman. 79 F.3d at 1539.
^- 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
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read by a human reader as distinguished from read by an expert with a microscope and
patience". ^^ Such a query stems from the early decision White-Swith Music Puhlishing
Co. v. Apollo Co., which held that a perforated piano roll was not a copy within the
meaning of the copyright Act because it was not in a form others could see or read^^
Nevertheless, it is clear from the language of the 1976 Act that it was not intended
to obliterate distinctions engendered by H'Tiite-Smith.^^ Under the statute, copyright
extends to works in any tangible means of expression "from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device". ^^ Congress also specified that the broad language of section 102 (a) "was
intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases
such as White-Smith Puhlishing Co. v. Apollo, under which statutory copyrightability, in
certain cases, has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is
fixed".^
Moreover, in the 1980 amendment. Congress defined computer program as "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result".^' However, object code is "directly" readable by computer
Therefore, computer program in object code "is a Miterary work' within the meaning of
the Copyright Act of 1976 and is protected from unauthorized copying".^"
2 - Source code
Source code is a set of instructions defining a software program, written in
programming language, understandable to humans. Unlike object code, which is executed
directly by the computer, source code is executed indirectly.^' Thus, a program written in
** Apple Computer. 714 F.2d at 1248.
^"209 0.5. 1. 17(1908).
** Apple Computer. 714 F.2d at 1248.
*' 17U.S.C. $ 102(a) (1976).
*' 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 5665 (1976).
^' 17U.S.C. $ 101 (1980).
'- Apple Computer. 714 F.2d at 1240.
^' Paperback. 740 F. Supp. at 43.
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source code must be translated into object code to run on a computer The translation is
effectuated '"through a mechanical process known as "compilation" or "assembly'"/^"*
Source code is a symbolic language. It often uses English words and common
mathematical symbols. ^^ Thus, a program written in source code can be read and
understood by humans. The case law is consistent in it ruling that a computer program in
source code is a ""literary work" and is protectable by copyright law.^^
B - Protection of non-literal elements
Protecting non-literal elements appears to conflict with section 102(b) of the 1976
Act that excludes process and method of operation from the scope of copyright law
Nevertheless, in the CONTU Report, the Commission said, "...flowcharts, source codes,
and object codes are works of authorship in which copyright subsists... ".^^ Therefore, the
'"reference to the copyrightability of flowcharts demonstrates that the Commission
intended copyright protection to extend beyond the literal code".^*
The non-literal aspects of computer software include all portions of program other
than the source and object codes. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc^
describes non-literal components of computer program as structure, sequence,
organization and user interface. The following chapter examines the protection of those
elements.
1 - Protection ofstructure, sequence and organization ofsofttvare
Programs are intended to accomplish particular tasks. Thus, the first step in
creating the program is identifying the problem that the computer programmer is trying to
solve. Then, the programmer may begin to outline a solution to solve the specific
''Bateman. 79F.3dat 1539.
^- Id at 1538.
'^ William Electronics. Inc. v. Artie International. Inc.. 685 F.2d 870. 875 (3rd Cir. 1982): Apple
Computer. 714 F.2d at 1249; Whelan Associates. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboraton. Inc.. 797 F.2d 1222.
1233 (3d Cir. 1986).
^'CONTUReponat21.
'^ Whelan Associates. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboraton. Inc.. 797 F.2d 1222. 1241 (3d Cir. 1986).
^ 886 F.2d 1 173. 1 175 (9th Cir. 1989).
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problem The outline can take the form of a flowchart, which will break down the
solution into a series of smaller units called "subroutines'" or "modules" (discrete parts of
programs with readily identifiable tasks). '*^*^ "The functions of the modules in a program
together with each module's relationship to other modules constitute the 'structure" of the
program".'"' The term "structure", "sequence" and "organization" are used
interchangeably by courts when referring to computer programs.
Considering the language used in the copyright Act of 1976. it is clear that
Congress intended that structure and organization of a literary work could be held
protectable. In effect, section 103'°^ specifically extends copyright protection to
compilations and derivative works. Although the 1976 Act "does not use the terms
"sequence', "order' or 'structure', it is clear from the definition of compilation'"' and
derivative work'"'^, and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact
that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted".'"^ Moreover, the
Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Sen'. Co., Inc.^^^ held that the
selection and arrangement (i.e., the organization) of facts may be protected under
copyright law. This case, however, did not specifically concern copyright protection of
software's structure. Nevertheless, some courts had to decide such an issue.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., the court had to
decide whether a program's copyright protection covers the structure of the program or
only the program's literal elements.'"^ The Whelan's court decided that the structure of
the allegedly infringing program was '"part of the program's expression, not its
"'" Whelan. 797F.2dat 1230.
"" Computer Associates International. Inc. v. Altai. Inc.. 982 F.2d 693. 698 (2d Cir. 1992).
"'- 17U.S.C.$ 103(1976).
"^^ See id $ 101 which defines a compilation as "a work formed b> the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."
'"^ See id $ 101 which defines a deri\ati\e work as "a work base upon one or more preexisting works..."".
'-'Whelan. 797 F.2d at 1239.
""^ 499 U.S. 340(1991).
"'
Whelan. 797 F.2d at 1233.
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idea"''^^because the idea of the program could be accomplished in a number of different
ways with a number of different structures. Then, the court concluded that "copyright
protection of computer programs may extend beyond the programs" literal code to their
structure, sequence and organization" T*^ Affer this decision, other courts had embraced
this ''general, noncrontroversial proposition, that non-literal aspects of copyrighted works,
like structure, sequence and organization, may be protected under copyright law".""
Thus, in conclusion, a computer's structure, sequence or organization are generally held
protectable under copyright law.
2 - Protection of the user interface
User interface is used to define the collection of keystrokes, menus, commands,
icons and screen displays that the user of a software program manipulates in order to
make use of the program.'"
In Lotus Development Corporation v. Paperback Software International^^^ , the
court had to decide whether an entire user interface was protected under copyright law.
The court applied its three-step test"' to the user interface and determined that its
copyrightability was established."^ More recently, some courts, confi-onted with the issue,
have also determined that copyright protection extends to computer user interface."^
These courts, however, applied the Altai "Abstraction-Fihration-Comparison" test"^ to
"* Whelan. 797 F.2d at 1236.
'"^Idat 1248.
"" Kepner - Tregoe. Inc. v. Leadership Soft\vare. Inc.. 12 F.3d 527. 536 (5ih Cir. 1994).
'" Arthur W. Fisher & Y\onne Re>es. Copyright Protection For Computer Software. 477/PLI/Pat 439.
449. 1997.
"- 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
"^ First step is to determine a programs idea and distinguish it from the programs expression of that
idea: the second step is to determine if the elements of a programs expression are essential to the
expression of that idea; finally, the third step is to decide whether the elements of expression that are
essential to the idea are a substantial part of the allegedly cop> rightable work.
'" Paperback. 740 F. Supp. at 68.
"""^
Engineering Ehnamics. Inc \ . Structural Software. Inc.. 26 F.3d 1335. 1341-43 (5th Cir. 1994).
'"^
In the abstraction step, the court should dissect the program according to its \ar>ing le\els of
generalit> ; then in the filtration step, the court should examine each le\ el of abstraction in order to filter
out those elements of the program w hich are unprotectable; finally in the companson step, the court
should compare the remaimng protectable elements with the allegedly infringing program to determine
whether the defendants ha\e misappropriated substantial elements of the plaintiffs program.
reach that conclusion. Whereas these courts and the Paperback court decided whether the
entire user interface was protected under copyright law, some other cases addressed the
issue of whether certain component parts of the user interface (menu, screen displays and
icons) are protected against infringement by copyright law.
Menu refers to the on-screen list of available fianctions or operations that can be
performed and can be accomplished by a number of means (e.g. a mouse or cursor key)."^
The leading case in the copyright protection of menus is Lotus Development Corp. v.
Boilond International, Inc.^^^ In that case, Borland copied the words and arrangement of
Lotus menu command hierarchy but Borland argued it was lawful. In effect, he contended
that "a menu command hierarchy is not copyrightable because it is a system, a method of
operation, a process or a procedure foreclosed from protection". '^^ The district court
"ruled that Lotus menu command hierarchy was a copyrightable expression". ^^'^ The first
circuit agreed with the district court position that "Lotus developers made some
expressive choices in choosing and arranging the Lotus command terms". ''^' However,
the first circuit decided that "the expression was not copyrightable because it is part of
Lotus 'method of operation'". '^'^ In effect, the court stated that "methods of operation"
are not limited to abstractions but "are a means by which a user operates something".'^'
"If specific words are essential to operating something, then they are part of a 'method of
operation' and, as such, are unprotectable".*^'* Lotus v. Borland represents the furthest
retreat in the protection of non-literal elements of software since Whelan^^^ which
provided a broad protection for those elements. Nevertheless, even if in Lotus v. Borland,
the court found that the Altai "Abstraction-Fihration-Comparison" test was of little help in
'
' Fisher & Reyes, supra note 1 1 1. at 449.
"M9F.3d807'(lthCir. 1995).
"'Id at 812
'-"Id at 810
'-' Id at 816
•"Id.
•-Md.
'-^^
Id.
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assessing whether the literal copying of a menu command hierarchy constituted copyright
infringement''^^, other relevant cases elaborated upon the Altai test and approved it as a
way of determining whether software menus are protectable by copyright. '^^
Screen displays are temporary images of graphics and text on the surface area of a
computer monitor.''^ Since Whelaji, courts have developed two approaches for trying to
deal with the screen display issues. In one line of cases, screen displays are treated as
protected aspects of the computer program. .An example of this approach is Lotus v.
Paperback. But as it has been explained above, the Paperback court had to decide
whether the user interface, as a whole, was protected by copyright law. Thus, screen
displays, which are a component part of the user interface, were thus also held protectable
In the decisions which form the other group, screen displays are treated as separate works
and since the Altai case'^^, the issue of protectability of screen displays has been
reasonably well settled.
In Altai, the court noted that screen displays are the products of a program and are
not considered to be a literal element of a computer program. Nevertheless, even if screen
displays are the product of a computer program whereas source and object codes are part
of the program itself, "the legal analysis for alleged instances of literal copying of either
code or screen displays is analytically quite similar".''" Then the Altai's court stated that
screen displays "fall under the copyright rubric of audiovisual works".'"'' Thus, as screen
displays are protected as audiovisual works, "apart form the literary work that generates
them (i.e., the program), the display may be protectable regardless of the underiying
'-^Borland. 49 F.3d at 815.
i:8
Gates Rubber Company \ . Bando Chemical Industries, limited. 9 F.3d 823. 843 (10th Cir. 1993).
Fisher & Reyes, supra note 1 1 1. at 449.
'-^982F.2d693(2dCir. 1992).
'^'' Bateman v. Mnemonics. Inc. 79 F.3d 1532. 1545 (11th Cir. 1996).
'^' Computer Associates. 982 F.2d at 703.
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1."
program's copyright status". "'' However, the copyright protection of screen display
extends only so far as its expression is protectable
'''
Icon refers to a picture or a symbol representing an object, a task or a command
that a user can select from the software program '"* Icons are a tool to facilitate
communication between the user and the computer.''^ Icons, like screen displays, fall
under the copyright rubric of audiovisual works and are subject to separate requirements
Nevertheless, unlike purely artistic works, "'graphical user interfaces generated by
computer programs are partly artistic and partly functional" ''^ It is thus important to
differentiate the idea or the function generated by the icon from the expression or the
graphic illustration of the icon. In other words, icons may be protectable separately from
the user interface if they meet independently the protection requirements of copyright law.
For example, in Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corporatiofi, the court held that a trash can
icon that depicts the discard fianction can be protected against identical copying, but the
function of deleting a command by clicking on the trash can icon cannot be protected.''^
In conclusion, non-literal aspects of computer software may be protected by
copyright law if they embody the expression of an idea but are different from the idea
itself And most of the time, courts have applied the three-step Altai's test to determine
the issue.
'^- Computer Associates. 982 F.2d at 703.
'^^ See Data East USA. Inc. v. Ep\-x. Inc.. 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988) where the coun decided that
features of a karate game on computer were not protectable because the\ follo\\ed from the idea of a
martial arts karate combat game and w ere inseparable from the idea of the karate sport.
'^^ Fisher &. Reyes, supra note 1 1 1. at 449.
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-' Apple Computer. Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation. 35 F.3d 1435. 1444 {9th Cir. 1994).
•^^Id.
'^'
Id.
CHAPTER IV
INFRINGING OR NON-INFRINGING USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE
The permitted use of copyrighted software has been the subject of many debates
especially when it has to do with competition. The following chapter first discusses
whether reverse engineering is an infiinging use of copyrighted software or if it falls under
the statutory exception of the "fair use" doctrine. Then, section B analyzes the "misuse"
defense used by defendants in copyright infiingement cases to assert that they are immune
from liability because the copyright owner has "misused" its copyright.
A - Reverse engineering
I - Definition
Programmers write software in source code language that uses a combination of
words and arithmetic expressions, understandable to humans. But as computer can only
utilize object codes, these source codes must be translated in object codes. The
translation process is called "assembly" or "compilation".
*"'*
Reverse engineering is the opposite process. It is the process of working
backward form a base level of a software program to a higher level of understanding of its
design and fimctionality.^'^ In other words, reverse engineering means working backward
from object code to get to source code. To do so, the object code is copied into a
'^^ William S. Coats & Heather D. Rafter, The Games People Play: Sega v. Accolade and the Right to
Reverse Engineer Software. 15 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 557. 558 (1993).
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computer's memory and then, the computer translates, "'decompiles" or "disassembles" it
into language that is intelligible to human readers
'"*"
Reverse engineering is extremely important for software developers Most of the
time, software owners distribute their software only as object codes Then, if someone
wants to study the ideas embodied in the program, he or she will have, first, to reverse
engineer the object codes in source codes. Then, when the program is decompiled, the
programmer can easily analyze the codes in order to develop compatible or competing
software.'"*'
Whether reverse engineering is considered an infringement depends primarily on
the purpose for using it. The purpose of reverse engineering can be divided into three
categories, research, competition and compatibility. '"*" Logically, reverse engineering for
research or compatibility should not be an infiingement, while reverse engineering for
competition may be. The test for ail three uses, however, is fair use.
2 - The statutory exception of ''fair use''
In early American law, a second author could abridge the first author's work and
as long as the abridgment of the work constituted a new work, the second author could
exercise identical rights as the first author concerning the abridgment without infiinging
the author's right on the copyrighted work. That concept was called the "fair abridgment"
doctrine In Folsom v. Marsh,^^' the court created the "fair use" doctrine. The purpose of
this case was to replace the fair abridgment doctrine by a limited one. The idea of the fair
use privilege was to enable a second author to use a part of a prior work for his own work
on certain conditions.
'*' Coats & Rafter, supra note 138. at 559.
'^' Marshall Leaffer. Engineering Competitive Polia and Copyright Misuse. 19 U. Da>lon L. Re\. 1087,
1090(1994).
'^" Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe. Jr.. Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer
Soft\vare: Reverse Engineering. Protection, and Disclosure. 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 61. 110-11
(1996).
"^9?. Cas. 342(1841).
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The Copyright Act of 1976 codified that judge-made doctrine in section 107.'"^
Section 107 provides four factors that courts must evaluate; (1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit; (2) the
nature of the work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or
value of the copyrighted work.
3 - Application ofthe "fair use" doctrine to rex^erse engineering
It is interesting to examine the different factors of reverse engineering to see if they
are fair use. As the compatibility purpose is more controversial regarding the application
of the fair use privilege, this part first examines the research and competitive purpose and
then analyzes the competitive purpose.
An evaluation of the fair use factors suggests that reverse engineering for research
purpose falls into the fair use exception.'"*^ First, in a pure research situation, the use of
the product is plainly non-commercial. Second, because computer programs have
fiinctional aspects which pure literary works do not contain, they are afforded less
protection. This point militates in favor of a finding of fair use.'"*^ For the third factor, the
court should determine the quantity of the copyrighted work taken. Nevertheless, for a
pure research situation, a subsequent work is not produced, thus, a court can conclude
that nothing has been taken. ^^'' Finally, when software is decompiled for research purpose,
"the lack of competing product should lead the court to conclude that there is no effect
upon the market value of the protected work". Therefore, reverse engineering for pure
research purpose is a non-infringing fair use. Moreover, Section 107 specifically provides
"' 17U.S.C. $ 107(1976).
'^"' Graham & Zerbe. Jr.. supra note 142. at 111.
"'id at 112.
•-'«
Id.
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that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purpose such as .. research is not an
infringement of copyright".
The second purpose of reverse engineering, competition, is the least favorable to
fair use. In effect, when a programmer decompiles a copyrighted software and then
creates a competitive program, it's obvious that he is doing so for commercial use.
Moreover, in a reverse engineering process, the programmer will take a substantial part of
the copyrighted work. Thus, the competitive product will certainly have a negative effect
upon the market of the copyrighted work. All these arguments weigh against the finding
of a fair use. Therefore, "decompilation for the purpose of developing a competing work
is an infringing act".^^*^
However, the third purpose of reverse engineering, compatibility, is more
controversial. In effect, compatibility often also includes some competition. The leading
cases in this area are Atari Games Corp. v. NitUeudo of America^^^ and Sega Enterprises
Ltd V. Accolade, Iiic.^^^.
In the Atari case, Nintendo designed a security system's program (lONES) to
prevent its home video game system (NES) from accepting unauthorized game
cartridges.'^"' Desiring to replicate the NES security system so that its game cartridges
would not be locked out of the NES, Atari reverse engineered lONES, and developed its
own program to unlock the NES.' "* Nintendo sued Atari for copyright infringement. The
district court assumed that reverse engineering (intermediate copying) was a copyright
infringement and granted a preliminary injunction. The federal circuit upheld the
injunction but disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The court noted that "the
legislative history of section 107 suggests that courts should adapt the fair use exception
"^ 17U.S.C. $ 107(1976).
'•'" Graham & Zerbe. Jr.. supra note 142. ai 1 14.
'" 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
'- 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
'-'^
Atari. 975 F.2d at 835-36.
\>A
Id at 836.
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to accommodate new technological innovations'"
'^'
Section 107 requires examination of
the nature of the work when determining a fair use exception The federal circuit
reasoned that "when the nature of a work requires intermediate copying to understand
ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that nature supports a fair use intermediate
copying".
'^^
Unfortunately, Atari was not in authorized possession of the copy of lONES.
Moreover, its final program was substantially similar to lONES.'" Nevertheless, even if
the federal circuit denied the fair use defense to .A.tari because of the previous arguments,
the court explicitly stated that reverse engineering of a computer program is fair use.'"**
In contrast with the result but not with the reasoning of the Atari case, the ninth
circuit, in Sega v. Accolade, held that reverse engineering of software in order to make
compatible product is a fair use. Sega is a Japanese corporation that manufactures video
entertainment systems, including the "Genesis" console and video game cartridges. '^^
Accolade, a developer and distributor of computer entertainment software, decompiled
Sega's video game programs in order to develop game cartridges compatible with Sega's
"Genesis" console. '^'^ This decompilation required the making of several copies of the
program code. Sega filed suit against Accolade alleging that the intermediate copying
during the reverse engineering process was an infiingement.'^' In addressing Accolade's
fair use defense, the ninth circuit analyzed each of the four non-exclusive factors set forth
in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
With respect to the first factor, the court rejected Sega's argument that "because
Accolade copied its object code in order to produce a competing product ... it precludes a
finding of fair use".'" In effect, the court pointed out that commercial use does weigh
" Atari. 975 F.2d at 843. quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1476. 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 66 (1976). reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 5679-80.
'^'^Id.
'"id at 845.
'-''id at 843.
''^Sega. 977F.2dat 1514.
'*'ldat 1515.
'^'
Id at 1517.
'*- Id at 1522.
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against fair use, but the ninth circuit said that Accolade's ultimate purpose was "simply to
study the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility"'^' and "the commercial aspect
of its use can best be described as a minimal significance". Then the court concluded
that the fourth factor also weighed in Accolade's favor "notwithstanding the minor
economic loss Sega may suffer". ' In effect, the ninth circuit said that "there is no basis
for assuming that Accolade's game has significantly affected the market for Sega's game,
since a consumer might easily purchase both" , nor does it seem unlikely, "particularly if
the games are ... not substantially similar" '^^. Considering the second factor, the court
noted that "disassembly of object code in Sega's video game cartridges was necessary in
order to understand the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility"'^^. Thus the
ninth circuit said that because "Sega's programs contain unprotected aspect than cannot
be examined without copying, we afford them a lower degree of protection that more
traditional literary work".'^^ Therefore, the ninth circuit concluded that the second factor
also weighed in favor of Accolade. Nevertheless, the court decided that the third factor
weighed against Accolade because Accolade had disassembled the entire program. But
the court provides that "the fact that an entire work was copied does not, however,
preclude a finding of fair use".'^" In summary, the court concluded that "the first, second
and fourth statutory fair use factors weigh in favor of Accolade, while only the third
weighs in favor of Sega, and even then, only slightly".'^' Therefore, the court held there
was fair use.
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Since those two cases, the fair use exception is commonly used as a defense in
litigation over software. Nevertheless, its success has been mixed. '^"
4 - The necessity to approve re^'erse engineering
The following part explains why reverse engineering should be legalized First,
legalizing reverse engineering can stimulate innovation and competition.'^' In effect.
sometimes, big companies do not innovate quickly enough because they lacked significant
competition. Thus, a broader approval of reverse engineering might stimulate big
companies to innovate in order to meet the new competition.'^"* Furthermore, if reverse
engineering is allowed, small companies will have access to unprotected ideas and thereby
could reduce development cost. ' Thus, a policy that allows reverse engineering may
profit consumers (because of the competition between software companies) and small
companies.
A second argument is that copyright owner would still have sufficient measures of
protection without the prohibition of reverse engineering.'^^ In effect, the reverse
engineer could only study the protected software and use the ideas contained in the work.
But "in the event the reverse engineer produces a substantially similar work, the copyright
owner would still have a cause of action for infiingement""^
However, some opponents contend that legalized reverse engineering would allow
competitors to examine the protected software, create a new product by making a few
changes and sell it as their own product. It would thus "allow competitors to reap the
benefits that others have incurred the cost".' Nevertheless, reverse engineering requires
'"- DSC Commun. Corp. v. DGI Technologies. Inc.. 898 F. Supp. 1 183 (N.D. Tex. 1995). where the court
held it \\as a fair use relying on Sega but denied the defense to defendants since the> did not ha\ e an
authorized copy (quoting Atari); or Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Corp.. 64 F.3d 1330 (1995).
where the ninth circuit refused the fair use defense because defendant "s use was not intermediate but final,
it decreased the value of plaintiff s copyright and it ser\ed directly competiti\e purposes.
'
'" Graham & Zerbe. Jr.. supra note 142. at 125.
'"^Id.
'"^Id.
'"^
Id at 133
'"Id.
''Id at 134
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time, skill and is expensive. Thus, there is little reason why software developers would
simply choose to misappropriate competing software with the fear of an infringement suit
Moreover, a statute allowing reverse engineering would certainly provide that this type of
misappropriation is illegal.
Therefore, considering all those arguments, reverse engineering should be broadly
approved.
B - The "misuse" defense
In copyright infiingement cases, the "misuse"defense is routinely used by
defendants who assert they did not infringe copyright law by using a copyrighted work
because the plaintiff, or copyright owner, has "misused"its copyright. This part first
explains the origin of the doctrine, then examines its acceptation by copyright law and
finally discusses where the defense is going.
/ - Origin
The misuse defense is not strictly a concept of software copyright law and traces
its origins to patent law.^^*^ In the patent context, the Supreme Court recognized the
doctrine in G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co.'^' In Morton Salt, the plaintiff held a
patent on a machine that deposited sah tablet in cans. Plaintiff was also making its own
salt tablet, an unpatented item, and required its licensees to use with the patented machine
only tablets sold by its company. '^^ Defendant also made and leased salt deposition
machine but had no patent on it. Thus, plaintiff sued defendant for patent infringement."*"'
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant because plaintiff had
misused its patent by "restraining competition with the patentee's sale of an unpatented
' ^ Graham & Zerbe. Jr.. supra note 142. at 135.
'*" Stephen J. Davidson & Nicole A. Englisch. A Sur\ey of the Law of Copyright Misuse and Fraud on the
Cop>Tight Office; Legitimate Restramts on Copyright Chsners or E.xcuses for Copynght Inrnngers"^. 483
PLLPat 295. 300(1997).
'^' 314 U.S. 488(1942).
'*- Id at 490.
'^Mdat491.
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product"'*"*, the salt tablet The Supreme Court upheld this decision and therefore
endorsed the "misuse" patent as an equitable defense for a suit for infringement of that
patent.'"
Nevertheless, even if the patent misuse defense has been generally recognized since
Morion Salt, it has been much less certain whether an analogous copyright misuse defense
exists. The copyright misuse defense got off to a slow start when a district court, in 1948,
actually applied a copyright misuse defense. "^^ Unfortunately, the decision was reversed
on appeal Over the course of the forty years after that decision, a lot of litigants tried
without success to revive the copyright misuse defense.'*^ The first successfiil use of the
doctrine as a defense to copyright infiingement arose from a computer copyright case,
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.
2 - Recognition of the copyright misuse defense: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
In the case, Lasercomb developed a software program for the production of dies
used to cut and score paper and cardboard boxes. The defendant licensed four prerelease
copies of the program, circumvented Lasercomb protective devices and made three
unauthorized copies of the program Then the defendant created a software program
"which was almost entirely a direct copy of Lasercomb 's program and marketed it as its
own".'*^ When Lasercomb discovered defendant's activities, it filed an action against it.
Nevertheless, defendant argued that "Lasercomb had misused its copyright by including in
its standard licensing agreement clauses which prevent the licensee from participating in
any manner in the creation of computer-assisted die-making software"'^ for ninety-nine
years. The district court rejected the misuse defense because defendant did not sign the
agreement in question. The fourth circuit, however, reversed the district court decision
MononSalt. 314U.S. at493.
'^-
It at 492.
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Da\idson & Englisch. supra note 180. at 302.
'^* 91 1 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
'*'ldat971.
'^' Id at 972.
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because Lasercomb's anticompetitive clauses in its standard licensing agreement
constituted misuse of copyright. The fourth circuit stated that "a misuse of copyright
defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in
patent law".'^^ Furthermore, the court said that **a misuse need not be a violation of
antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action".'^'
To summarize the Lasercomb decision, a misuse defense will be recognized when
"the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the
grant of a copyright. '^'^ Moreover, defendant does neither have to show that the
copyright owner has violated the antitrust law or that he has been injured by the misuse. '^^
Nevertheless, plaintiff can purge himself of the misuse and then bring a suit for
infringement.
3 - Application ofthe misuse defense after the Lasercomb case
After the Lasercomb case, other courts have recognized the copyright misuse
defense but their approaches sometimes differed from the fourth circuit's approach.
For some courts, the misuse defense requires the finding of an antitrust
violation '^^ For example, in BellSouth Ad\>ertising d Publications Corp. v. Donne/ley
Information Publishing, Inc.^^^, the eleventh circuit said that "although the patent misuse
defense closely fits the copyright law situation and may someday be extended to discipline
those who abuse their copyrights, we decline to extend the application in the context
before us because there is no antitrust violation". '^^ Thus, the court required a finding of
an antitrust violation before it applies the misuse defense.
'^' Lasercomb. 91 1 F.2d at 979.
''-Id at 973.
''^ Id at 978.
'^^
Id.
'''
Id at 979.
'^^ Da\idson & Englisch. supra note 180. at 307.
''" 933 F.2d 952(1 1th Cir. 1991).
"* Id at 961.
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For some other courts, the misuse defense has nothing to do with antitrust law and
is basically an "unclean hands" defense. '^^ As for example in Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., the federal circuit held that "in the absence of any statutory
entitlement to a copyright misuse defense, however, the defense is solely an equitable
doctrine (and) any party seeking equitable relief must come to court with 'clean
hands'".'"'^
Finally, some courts took an intermediary approach. In the decisions, which form
that line of thought, misuse might have some correlation with antitrust law, but it can also
exists separate and apart form any antitrust violation. ^^" This approach is similar to the
fourth circuit's approach in Lasercomb and has been taken for example in DSC
Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.^^'^
In conclusion, the misuse defense seems to be generally recognized by courts.
Nevertheless, its application might vary with the approach taken by the circuit trying the
case.
'^^ Da\idson & Englisch. supra note 180. at 307.
-'"' 975 F.2d 832. 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
'"^ Da\idson & Englisch. supra note 180. at 307.
-"-81F.3d592(5thCir. 1996).
CHAPTER V
NEWSTA TUTORY PROTECTIOS FOR SOmrARE 0^'^'ERS A\D USERS
The 1976 Copvright Act has been modified more than once to adapt to new
technologies. The following chapter examines two changes made by Congress to adapt
the Copyright Act to computer software
A - The Rental Amendments Act of 1990
At the end of 1990, Congress amended section 109 of the Cop\Tight Act'^' to
exclude the rental and other temporar\- transfer of possession of computer programs fi'om
the first sale doctrine. This part examines, first, the first sale doctrine, then, it describes
the Rental Amendments Act of 1990^^^ and its exemptions.
/- Thefirst sale doctrine
Copyright ownership consists of five exclusive rights: (1) the right to reproduce
the work; (2) the right to prepare derivative works based upon the work; (3) the right to
distribute copies of the work; (4)&(5) the right to perform and display certain types of
works publicly. '^''^ Nevertheless, the cop\Tight owner's exclusive rights are limited in
various ways by the copyright law."^^ The first sale doctrine, codified in section 109 of the
^'^ 17U.S.C. $ 109(1976).
^ Judicial improvement Act of 1990. Pub.L. No. 101-650. $$ 801-805. 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 (1990)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)-(d)(1990)).
-"- 17 U.S.C. $106(1976).
-^ See id $$ 107-120.
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1976 Copyright Act, is an important limitation on the right of the copyright owner to
distribute his work.
The first sale doctrine finds its origin in the famous Bobhs-Menill Co. v.
Strauss^'^^case. The plaintiff printed a notice in its copyrighted book, specifying that any
sale of the book for less than one dollar would be treated as a copyright infringement.'^^'*
Plaintiff sued R.H. Macy & Company for copyright infringement after they sold the book
for eighty-nine cents. The court said that adding "to the right of exclusive sale the
authority to control all future retail sales ... would give a right not included in the statute,
and, in our view, extends its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning... ".^"^ In
other words, "the right to vend only encompassed the right to make the initial sale and not
the right to place restrictions on future sales''.^'" Congress codified the first sale doctrine
in section 41 of the 1909 Copyright Act^^^ a year after the Bohhs-Merrill case. The
copyright revision Act of 1976 replaced section 41 with section 109, the current
codification of the first sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine permits the lawful owner^'^ of
a particular copy of a copyrighted work "to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy"^'' without the copyright owner's permission. ,
Nevertheless, with new technologies, it is more and more easy to duplicate a
work.^^"* That is why Congress realized the necessity of creative exceptions to the first
-"'210 U.S. 339(1908).
-'*
Id at 341-42.
f" Id at 351.
-"' Kenneth R. Corsello. The Computer Sofhvare Rental Amendments Act of 1990: Another Bend in the
First Sale Doctrine. 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 177. 189 (1991).
-" 17U.S.C. $$ 1-216(1909).
-' 17 U.S.C. $ 109(d) provides that the first sale doctrine does not extend to person who acquired
possession by illegal means or by rental, lease or lending.
-'^SeeidS io9(a).
-'^ Audio works can be copied using a standard audio cassette player and almost e\er\ computer is capable
of duplicating computer program. See Computer Rental Amendments Act of 1988: Hearings on S. 2727
Before the Subcomm. on Patents. Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary.
lOOth Cong.. 2d Sess. 15 (1988)(testimony of Heidi Roizen. President. T/Maker Co.): Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 198 Before the Subcomm. on Patents. Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar.. 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 16 (1 989)(statement of Ralph
Oman. Register of Copyright).
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sale doctrine In 1984, Congress enacted the Record Rental Amendment Act Z^'" This
amendment prohibits the owner of a copyrighted phonorecord from renting, leasing, or
lending the work without the permission of the owner of the copyright/^"' Congress
added this provision to the Copyright Act because, as it is easy and cheap to copy a
phonorecord. Congress feared that illegal duplication would have a serious effect on the
recording industry. '^^^ A similar legislation that would have exempted video tape rentals
from the first sale doctrine was also considered but it was never approved by Congress."'^
In 1990, Congress enacted the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act. Congress
stated this new exception to the first sale doctrine in order "to protect the software
industry from sales lost when potential purchasers rent and make copies of software
instead of purchasing the product".
2- Application and interpretation of the 1990 Computer Softyvare Rental Amendments
Act
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act amended section 109 of the
1976 Copyright Act. The new section 109 provides in relevant part:
"Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a), unless authorized by ... the owner of
copyright in a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying
such program), ...(no) person in possession of a particular copy of a computer program
(including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying such program) may, for the purpose
of direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that computer program (including tape, disk, or other medium embodying
-''Pub.L. No. 98-450. 98 Stat. 1727 (1984). codified at 17 U.S.C. $ 109.
-'^ 17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)(1) (1988) provided in rele\ant part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(a), unless authorized by the owners of copynght in the sound recording and in the musical works
embodied therein, the ow ner of a particular phonorecord ma\ not. for purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of. or authorize the disposal of the possession of that phonorecord by
rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending."
-'"
H.R.Rep. No. 987. 98th Cong.. 2d Sess. 7 (1984) repnnted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898.2899.
-'** H.R. 1029. 98th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1983). reprinted in Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Heanngs on
H.R. 1027. H.R. 1029 and S. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Courts. Civil Liberties and the Admin, of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciar>. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. 729 (1984. 1985): S 33. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1983). reprinted in Audio and Video Rental; Hearings on S. 32 and S. 33 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents. Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. 5
(1983).
-'' Corsello. supra note 210. at 180-81.
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such program) by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of
rental, lease, or lending."
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act does not have any retroactive effect Thus, the Rental prohibition does
not apply to copies lawfijlly obtained prior to December 1, 1990, the effective date of the
Act.^^"^
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act has been enacted recently.
Therefore, courts did not have a lot of opportunities to interpret it. A court applied the
Act, for the first time, in Central Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software c^- Accessories,
Inc.^^^ Plaintiffs, a group of computer software manufacturers, collectively own a number
of copyrights in computer programs. Defendant, Global Software and Accessories, Inc.
(Global) is engaged in the business of renting computer software. Global "rented"
upgrade versions of plaintiffs software, acquired after December 1, 1990.'^^^
Furthermore, Global sought to market software through a so-called "Deferred Billing
Plan" (DBP). Under the DBP, customers could take computer software home and keep it
for up to five days for a nonreflindable deposit and avoided paying the balance of the
purchase price by returning the software within those five days.^^' Global used the DBP
exclusively for copies of computer software acquired on or after December 1, 1990.
Therefore, plaintiffs brought an action against defendant alleging copyright inftingement
for violation of the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990.
"" 104 Stat. 5136 (1990). Section 804. Effective Date, provides in pertinent part: (b) Section 109(b) of
Title 17. United States Code, as amended b> section 802 of this Act. shall not affect the nght of a person
in possession of a particular copy of a computer program, who acquired such copy before the date of the
enactment of this Act. to dispose of the possession of that copy on or after such date of enactment in any
manner permitted by section 109 of title 17. United States Code, as in effect on the da> before such dale of
enactment.
"' 880 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
-" Id at 960.
--Mdat961.
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Global argued that "an upgrade is an improvement to the original software and not
a new copy"'^^"* and that "the earlier version and the upgrade should be treated as element
of the same copy of software". ^^^ Furthermore, it argued that its DBP transactions were
legal sales under the New York's Uniform Commercial Code (New York U.C.C ) and
therefore did not constitute the rental of software.
^^^
The court rejected Global's arguments finding that "the exemption for pre-Rental
Amendment copies applies only to a 'particular copy' possessed before the amendment
took effect". '^^^ Nevertheless, the upgrade versions were copies acquired after the
amendment took effect and thus, were subject to the amendment's rental ban.^^*
Moreover, the court said that the New York U.C.C. does not apply to the Copyright Act
and that Global's DBP transactions constituted "a practice in the nature of rental of
computer software in violation of the Act". Regarding this case, an upgrade version of
software is therefore considered as a copy of the software and falls under the amendment's
rental ban.
3 - The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act's exemptions
Section 109 provides some exemptions to the general prohibition of renting
software without the express permission of the software copyright owner.
First of all, the transfer of a "computer program which is embodied in a machine or
product and which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the machine
or product"^'" is exempt from the Rental prohibition. Otherwise, copyright owners would
have had the authority to prohibit or limit the rental of any equipment that may utilize a
copyrighted software. Therefore, microwave ovens, airplanes, cars and other common
products that may embody computer programs, may continue to be rented without fear of
--' Central Point Software. 880 F. Supp. at 960.
"Id at 961.
--''Id at 963.
--"
Id.
'''
Id.
"^ Id at 966.
-^" 17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)(1)(B) (1990).
40
copyright infringement.^"'^ Likewise, the transfer of a program "used in conjunction with a
limited purpose computer that is designed for playing video games and may be designed
for other purposes"^'^ is also exempted from the provision. In effect. Congress concluded
that such programs are "generally used solely for the playing of these games and not used
to copy the computer programs that generate the game".^'' Therefore, the copyright
owner does not have to fear illegal duplication of their software. Nevertheless, video
game developers argued that the rental of video games destroys the market of sales of
games and, thus, takes away the financial incentive to create new games. ^""* But video
games developers did not succeed with their arguments.
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act also permits "the lending of a
computer program for nonprofit purposes by a nonprofit library". ^'^ Nevertheless, the
nonprofit library exemption requires librarians to place a warning of copyright on every
computer lent.^'^ The Act also provides that "the transfer of possession of a lawfiilly
made copy of a computer program by a nonprofit educational institution to another
nonprofit educational institution or to faculty staff, and students does not constitute rental,
lease, or lending for direct or indirect commercial purposes". ^"'^ Congress enacted these
provisions because these institutions "serve a valuable public purpose by making computer
software available to students who would not otherwise have access to it".^'* The
distinction between the lending exemption for nonprofit libraries and the transfer
exemption for nonprofit educational institutions is somewhat obscure. In effect, the terms
are practically coextensive, since "lending" is certainly a "transfer of possession" and when
:3i
Joseph &. Vogel. supra note 78. at 461.
-^- 17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)(1)(B) (1990).
-^^ H.R. Rep. No. 735. 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. 8-9 (1990).
^^ SoftAvare Rental Amendments of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts. Intellectual Propert>
and the Admin, of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciar\. 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. 2. 215-17 (1990)
(letter from James Chame. Vice President. Absolute Entertainment. Inc.).
-^' 17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)(2)(A) (1992).
-^^ See id.
-^'
17 U.S.C. $ 109(b)(1)(A) (1992).
-^^ H.R. Rep. No. 735. 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. 8 (1990).
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educational institutions "transfer possession' to faculty staff and students, the act is almost
always a loan."'
In conclusion, the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act provides a remedy
which protects the software industry- from sales lost Nevertheless, the success of the
software industry in receiving such protection will probably motivate other copyright
owners, whose works can be duplicated as easily as software, to petition Congress for
similar specified exception to the first sale doctrine. However, even if the justification of
copyright protection is to provide incentive for the creation of works of authorship^'*", it is
also important to remember that the central theme of copyright law is to provide the
public with access to creative works. ^"*' Therefore, Congress should be careflil to balance
"the over-arching desire to provide public access against the degree to which duplication
of works will destroy the market and take away the incentive to create".
^"'^
B - Lawful copies and adaptation of protected software
In 1980, two years after the final report of the Commission on the New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Congress made two changes to the
1976 Copyright Act.'^"*"' First, Congress defined a "computer program" in section 101 of
the 1976 Act. Second, Congress repealed section 117 of the 1976 Act.^"^ The new
^^ Journal of the Copyright Societ> of the U.S.A.. The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of
1990: The Nonprofit Librars Lending E.xemption to the "Rental Right". 41 J. Copyright Socy U.S.A.
231.291-92(1994).
J"'U.S. Const, artl. $8. cl. 8.
^' The United States Constitution gi\es Congress the power to grant copyright in order to "Promote the
Progress of Science". U.S. Const, art I. $ 8. cl. 8. the term "Science" ha\ing been used to mean general
knowledge. The preambule to the first federal copyright statute slated that it was passed "for the
encouragement ofleaming". Act of May 31. 1790. ch. 15. 1 Slat. 124 (repealed 1802. 1819. 1831. 1834).
-"-
Corsello. supra note 210. at 208.
-^^ The amendments were passed as pan of the Copyright Act of 1980. Pub.L. No 96-517. $ 10. 94 Slat.
3015. 3028 (amending 17 U.SC. $$ 101. 1 17 (1976)).
"^^ 17 use. $ 117 (1976) provided: "Not\vithstanding the provisions of section 106 through 1 16 and
1 18. this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect
to the use of the w ork in conjuclion w ith automatic s> stems capable of storing processing. retrie\ing. or
transferring information, or in conjunction w ith any similar de\ ice. machine, or process, than those
afforded to w orks under the law . w helher title 1 7 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 3 1. 1977. as held applicable and construed by a coun in an action brought under this title.
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section 117 is the only section in the Act to deal exclusively with computer program.
Section 1 17 provides.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it in not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightftil.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be
leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies
were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the
program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization
of the copyright owner.
"^"'^
This part examines, first, the application of section 1 1 7 and then, it analyzes the
privilege of reproduction and adaptation under section 117.
1 - The court's application ofamended section 117
The phrase "owner of a copy of a computer program", used in amended section
117, is not defined in the statute and its ambiguity creates problem for the application of
section 117. Moreover, the CONTU Final Report which, according to the legislative
history of amended section 1 1 7, was being followed, recommended that "a rightfijl
possessor of a copy" should be able to assert the privilege granted by the proposed section
J ly 246 g^^ CONTU neither defined what was intended by "rightfiil possessor".
Therefore, courts had to interpret the phrase "owner of a copy". The first decision
that provided considerable insight into the meaning of the term "owner", found in section
117, is Vault Corp. v. Oiiaid Software Ltd^^^ In the case. Vault produces computer
diskettes which are designed to prevent the unauthorized duplication of programs placed
-' 17U.S.C. $ 117(1980).
-^ CONTU Final Report, at 12 (1978).
-'" 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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on them by software companies. Vault's customers. ^"'^ Quaid acquired a copy of the
program under a license from Vault^"*^, and created a computer program that "facilitates
the creation of a fully fiinctional copy of a protected diskette". ^^" Vault brought an action
against Quaid but Quaid contended that its activities fall within the section 1 17 exception.
First, the Fifth Circuit said that the archival exception stated in section 117(2) was
applicable to a copy of a program made "for any reason so long as the owner used the
copy for archival purposes only and not for unauthorized transfer". ^^' The court
concluded that Congress imposed no restrictions upon archival copying in section 1 1 7(2)
and decided that Quaid' s copying was privileged under amended section 11 7(2) because
it served an archival purpose. Then, the Fifth Circuit noted that when Quaid loaded
Vault's program into its computer, "the copy made by Quaid was 'created as an essential
step in the utilization' of Vault's program"'^" and concluded that section 117(1) was
applicable. Therefore, the court decided implicitly that Quaid was "an owner" and applied
the amended section 1 17.'^^' Thus, according to this case, section 117 apply to a program'
licensee.
On the other hand, the court in S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc^^^ took a different
position. In that case, S.O.S. was supposed to fiirnish Payday with computer programs
and modify them to meet Payday's need in exchange of a sum of money. '^^^ The
agreement provided that S.O.S. retained ownership of the programs and Payday was
acquiring the right to use them.^^^ Nevertheless, Payday acquired an unauthorized copy of
S.O.S. 's program, modified it and provided computer services to its clients with them.
-'* Vault. 847 F.2d at 256.
'^^ Id at 257 n. 2. this agreement was a shrink-wrap licensing agreement that \\as not negotiated and was
unilaterah fa\ orable to Vault.
-'"
Id.
-" Id at 266.
--'-Id at 261,
-"
Id.
-^ 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
-'-'Id at 1083.
-^^ Id at 1084.
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When SOS discovered Payday's activities, it brought an action for copyright
infringement."^^ The ninth circuit cited section 1 17 and said that "an owner of a copy of
software has certain rights under the copyright Act which a mere possessor does not"/^^*
Then the ninth circuit concluded that Payday exceeded the scope of its license but
remanded the determination of whether Payday was an infringer to the district court.
According to that case, section 1 1 7 does not apply to a mere possessor of a software (but
it is important to notice that in S.O.S., defendant had an unauthorized copy of the
software, whereas in Vault, it acquired the copy under a license).
In some other cases, the terms of a transaction are not clear on the issues of
transfer of ownership of a software, as for example in Synergistic Technologies, Inc. v.
IDB Mobile Communication.^^^ In that case, the statement of work under which plaintiff
created the software for defendant was ambiguous about the transfer of ownership In
order to apply section 1 1 7, the court stated that the determination of the owner was "also
governed by $ 2-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code, D.C.Code Ann. $ 28:2-401
(1991)"^^"which applies to contracts for the sale of goods. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, "title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the good unless
otherwise explicitly agreed".
^^'
Therefore, courts have first to determine the "owner of a copy of a computer
program" in order to apply section 117. Nevertheless, this determination is highly factual
and courts have to examine it case by case.
--"
S.O.S.. 886 F.2d 1084.
-^
Id at 1088 n.9.
-' 871 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1994).
-*'
Id at 29.
Id (quoting $ 28:2-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
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2 - The privilege ofreproduction and adaptation under section 117
Section 1 1 7 allows the "owner of a copy of computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program". ^^' In
effect, CONTU in its Final Report stated that;
"Because of a lack of complete standardization among programming languages
and hardware in the computer industry-, one who rightfiilly acquires a copy of a
program frequently cannot use it without adapting it to that limited extent which
will allow its use in the possessor's computer. The copyright law, which grants to
copyright proprietors the exclusive right to prepare translations, transformations,
and adaptations of their work, should no more prevent such use than it should
prevent rightfiil possessors from loading programs into their computers. Thus, a
right to make those changes, necessary to enable the use for which it was both sold
and purchased, should be provided.
""*""'
Nevertheless even if section 1 17 allows some adaptations of computer software, it
does not define what the right includes. In Foresight Resources Corp. v. PfortmHler^^^,
the court said that "the right of adaptation includes the right to add features to the
program that were not present at the time of rightful acquisition". ^^^
Moreover, the scope of the right to adapt the software is also left undefined by the
copyright law. However, in Foresight Resources, the court stated that the right of
adaptation "was intended to apply to modifications for internal use, as long as the adapted
program is not distributed in an unauthorized manner". ^^^ Or in Aymes v. BoueUi^^^ , the
second circuit also permitted substantial modifications to the computer program by a third
person because defendant "was the rightfiil owner of the program"'^^ and therefore had
the right to authorize the making of adaptation of the program. Moreover, the
-" 17U.S.C. $ 117(1980).
-" CONTU Final Report, at 32 (1978).
-^ 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
-*- Id at 1009.
-^Idat 1009-10.
-^" 47 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1994).
-^ Id at 24.
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modifications '"were necessarv' measures in its continuing use of the software in operating
its business".
'^^
In conclusion, rather than providing a defense to software user who copied or
modified a software through an interpretation of the term "owner" in amended section
1 1 7, courts can also do so through the fair use exception codified in section 1 07 of the
Copyright Act. As for example in AUen-hdyland, Inc. v. Inteniational Business Machine
Corp^^^, the court found that the amended section 117 exception was inapplicable
because the adaptations made to the program did not fall within the essential step
limitation of section 117.^^' Then, the court considered the four criteria set out by
Congress in section 107. Although the outcome in Allen-Myland favored the copyright
claimant, it was reached only after the court examined all relevant fair use criteria.
'^^^
Therefore, the fair use doctrine is more flexible than amended section 1 1 7 because the
doctrine does not examine the copy ownership and moreover, no single criterion in section
107 is considered definitive in determining when the defense is available. ^^"'
-'^^ Aymes. 47 F.3d at 26.
-'" 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D.Pa. 1990).
-"'
Id at 535-37.
-"-Id at 533-35.
-'^ Harper & Row Publishers. Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. 471 U.S. 539. 554 (1985).
CHAPTER VI
ALTERNA TIVE FORMS OF PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE
Computer programs are different from other creations subject to intellectual
property protection. They are part writing, part invention and part artistry. Therefore,
computer programs seem eligible for other forms of protection than copyright law.
A - Trade Secret protection
1 - Definition and application oftrade secret protection
Trade secrets are widely protected in the United States. Improper use or
disclosure of a trade secret is generally a common law tort. The 1939 Restatement of
Torts is the first principal document that set forth the law of trade secret. Section 757,
comment b of the Restatement provides:
"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, or process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers...
"^^"^
Even though computer programs are not listed in the Restatement definition, many courts,
following this definition, have applied trade secret protection to software.
^^'
With the promulgation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, computer programs
have been specifically held protectable by trade secret. Section 1 of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act provides:
-'"*
Restatement (First) of Torts. $ 757. comment b (1939).
-"'
Universit> Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstoun Corp.. 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Integrated Cash
Management Ser\ices. Inc. v. Digital Transactions. Inc.. 920 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990).
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"'Trade secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, form being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use and
(ii) is the subjects of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
"'^^^'
Therefore, with this broader definition of trade secret, computer programs can receive
trade secret protection.
Nevertheless, several factors are considered in order to determine if a software is
actually protected by trade secret. First of all, the party asserting trade secret status must
prove that the computer program contains specific features not generally known or readily
ascertainable to others in the relevant mdustry.' In other words, he must prove that the
program is sufficiently secret. For example, courts have denied trade secret protection for
program elements which can be ascertained by observation or by reverse engineering
without significant time and effort.
^^*
The proprietor of the program also has to prove that the program derives present
or potential economic value because of its secrecy. ^^^ Otherwise, if the secrecy is not
valuable, there is no reason to allow trade secret protection.
Furthermore, the party asserting trade secret protection must take reasonable
measures to maintain the information in confidence.^*" This includes precautions such as
employee confidentiality agreement, or if the computer software is distributed to
customers or third party, trade secret can be maintained by imposing and enforcing
-
'' Uniform Trade Secrets Act. with 1985 Amendments. $ 1.
" See generally Uniform Trade Secrets Act. with 1985 Amendments.
-"*
In Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.. 64 F.3d 1330(9th Cir. 1995). in the earlier ruling
denving Triad" s motion for preliminary mjunction. Judge Smith held that Triad had not shown that it had
adequately preser\ ed the confidentialit> of the subject information because the information w as a\ailable
through use or relati\ ely simple re\erse engineering of software tapes origmally sold b> Triad without
restriction.
"^ See generally Uniform Trade Secrets Act. with 1985 Amendments.
-^"Id.
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appropriate confidentiality obligation upon the recipient " This should be done by
appropriate proprietary- legends upon the exterior of the tape and on the screen display
produced by the program, as well as by restrictive license agreement provisions that state
that the licensee must treat the software in confidence.'^'
All those requirements limit trade secret protection. Nevertheless, when software
meet all those requirements, trade secret protection has several advantages over copyright
protection
2 - Advantages oftrade secret protection over copyright protection
First of all, as long as it is a secret, trade secret information can include not just the
form of expression but also the underlying idea, process or method.^*"' Whereas, under
copyright law, "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle
or discovery"^^"* are not protectable because it is dictated by functional consideration.
Thus, trade secret and copyright protection can co-exist, the copyright protecting the form
of expression and the trade secret protecting the underlying ideas and method.
Second, there is no fair use defense in trade secret. ^^" Therefore, there is no
excuse for any infringing use through disassembly, incidental or intermediate copying like
in copyright law.
Finally, it is easier to have an injunction against a defendant's competing product
that was derived from wrongful use or disclosure of a trade secret even if the final product
is not substantially similar to the plaintiffs."*^ Moreover, punitive damages for willfijl
infringement are higher under trade secret than what is authorized by section 540(b) of the
copyright law.^*^
-*' Richard L. Goflf. Can Soft\^a^e Cop\ right Restrict Related Competition'. 1 1 NO. 10 Computer La\\ . 9.
16(1994).
^-Id.
-''
Id.
-^"' 17U.S.C. $ 102(b) (1976).
-^-
Gofif. supra note 281. at 16.
286 j^
^' 17 U.S.C. $ 504(b) (1976).
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Nevertheless, it is important to notice that trade secret is protected by state laws
Therefore, if a conflict arises between trade secret and copyright law, normally, under
copyright law, trade secret, grounded in state law, is preempted by federal copyright law.
3 - Possible preemption by copyright law
Federal copyright law provides that state law rights might be preempted by
copyright law.^*** Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts only state law rights that
"may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive
rights" provided by federal copyright law.^^^ Nevertheless, a state claim is not preempted
if an "extra element" changes the "nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different
from a copyright infringement claim".
Computer Associates hiteniatiotial, Inc. v. Altai, Itic.^^^ created a confusion on
whether trade secret claims are preempted or not by federal copyright law. In its first
opinion, the second circuit "concluded that there was no qualitative difference between
Computer Associates' s state law trade secret claims and a claim for federal copyright
infringement".'^^' Therefore, Judge Pratt completely affirmed the district court's decision
and ruled that Computer Associates' s trade secret claims were preempted by section
301.'^^"' Upon further filings by Computer Associates, the second circuit changed its mind.
The court said that Computer Associates' s complaint does plead a claim of trade secret
misappropriation which is not preempted by the Copyright Act.^^"*
-^* 17 U.S.C. $ 301(a) (1976) pro\ides that "On and after Januar> 1. 1978. all legal or equitable rights that
are equi\ alent to any of the exclusi\ e rights w ithin the general scope of cop> right as specified b> section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 and 103. whether created before of after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are go\erned exclusi\ely by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equi\alent right in am such work under the common law or statutes ofam State."
-^' Harper & Row. Publishers. Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. 723 F.2d. 195. 200 (2d Cir. 1983).
-^' Id at 201.
-" 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
-^- Id at 718.
'''
Id.
-''Id at 720-21.
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After the Computer Associates case, courts have routinely found that trade secret
claims are not preempted by federal copyright law.'^^'
In conclusion, when a computer program qualify for trade secret protection, such a
protection is advantageous. In effect, it can co-exist with copyright protection and
protects the uncopyrightable underlying ideas in the software.
B - Patent protection
Patent law gives the inventors the exclusive privilege of using a certain process or
of making, using and selling a specific product or device for a specified period of time.
The basis for the U.S. patent law is found in the Constitution. Article 1, section 8, clause
8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to award exclusive rights for a limited time to
authors and inventors "for their respective writings and discoveries". Therefore, Congress
has the power to enact patent statutes. The first U.S. patent statute was passed in
jy^Q 296 yj^^ actual legal basis for patent protection in the United States is the 1952
Patent Act. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "whoever invents or discovers
any new and usefLil process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title" /^^^ This part, first, examines the applicability of patent law
to software, then, it describes the new rules established by the PTO Guidelines for
computer-related invention, and finally, it analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of
patent protection for software over copyright protection.
-'' Gates Rubber Company v. Bando Chemical Indusin. Limited. 9 F.3d 823. 847-48 (10th Cir. 1993)
(where the court said that the requirement of proof of breach of a dut> of trust or confidence is the
gra\ amen of trade secret claims and supplies the extra element that qualitati\ el> distinguishes such trade
secret causes of actions from claims for copyright infringement); See also Trandes Corp. \ . Guy F.
Atkinson Co.. 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993) (where the court said that the requirement of abuse of
confidence or impropriet> in the means of procurement provides the extra element to prevent preemption).
-^ Patent Act of 1790. Ch. 7. 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10. 1790).
-'"35U.S.C. $ 101(1982).
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1 - Patentability ofcomputer softyvare
The patentability of computer software has long been a subject of controversy
Patent protection for software was generally thought not to be available prior a 1981
Supreme Court decision "^^^ In Diamond v. Diehr, Diehr invented "a process for molding
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products".'^ The Diehr invention
measures the temperature inside the mold and feeds the temperature measurements into a
computer that repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of a mathematical equation and
then signals a device to open the press at proper time."'"" Diehr filed a patent application
but the patent examiners rejected his claim on the ground that the steps in his claim, that
are carried out by a computer under control of a stored program, constituted non-
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. $ 101.'°' The Supreme Court said first, that
"courts should not read into the patent law limitations and conditions which the legislative
has not expressed".'"' Then the Court reminded that the traditionally known exclusions to
the patent statute are "laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract idea"'"'. Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that the fact that in several steps of a process, a mathematical
equation and a programmed digital computer are used does not prevent the process fi"om
falling within the $ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject.'""*
After the Diehr case, other decisions granted limited patent protection to software.
These decisions articulated a two-part test of patentability.'"^ The first part of the test
involves determining if the invention at issue contains a mathematical algorithm. If it does
-^* Diamond V. Diehr. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
299
Id.
3IKI
Id.
301
Id at 180.
3ci;
Id at 182.
303
Id at 185.
3IM
Id at 184-85.
^"'
In re Abele. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Grams. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed Cir. 1989); In re
Awahashi. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989); ArrhNihmia Research Technolog>. Inc. \ . Corazonix Corp..
958F.2d 1053(1992).
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not, the invention is a patentable subject matter, but if the invention contains a
mathematical algorithm, then it triggers the second part of the test. Under the second
part, the court has to determine whether the algorithm is the primary focus of the
invention. Therefore, if the invention involves a patentable process that makes use of the
mathematical algorithm, which is not the primary focus, the invention is a patentable
subject matter. This two-part test has proven difficulty to apply.'"^ Nevertheless, the
trend has been to find that software are patentable. This trend has been confirmed in /// re
Alappaf^'' , where the federal circuit concluded that software for general purpose
computers might be patented. '^^ Therefore, the /// re Alappat decision resolved any doubt
as to the patentability of software.
However, deciding whether computer programs qualify as patentable subject
matter is only the first step in obtaining a software patent. The patent law provides four
more criteria.
First, the software invention must be novel. '^^ In other words, it must be different
from prior software inventions made, known, used, patented by others or sold in the
United States more than a year before the patent application was filed.
Second, the software invention must be usefiil.''" However, it is only if the
software invention has absolutely no "practical utility" that the patent will be denied."''
'
Therefore, most computer programs that work will meet this second requirement.
Third, the software invention must be non-obvious. The subject matter sought to
be patented must have been, as a whole, non-obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art of the invention.''^ It is the most important
requirement because it attempts to measure the technical accomplishment reflected in the
"^ In re Grams. 888 F.2d at 840-41: See also In re Awahashi. 888 F.2ci al 1375.
^""33F.3dl526(Fed. Cir. 1994)
^'*
Id at 1545.
^"^ 35 U.S.C. $ 102.
^"'35U.S.C. $ 101.
^" Merges. Menell. Lemlev & Jordes. supra note 1. at 129.
^'-35U.S.C. $ 103.
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invention."''' Nevertheless, the comparison to prior art is difficult to determine In effect,
many new developments in computer programming are not documented in scholariy
publications. Therefore, examiners may miss relevant prior art because of a lack of
computer program background."'
Finally, the software inventor must give a good description of the invention and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such flill, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art of the invention to make and use the same
invention."''^ This last requirement ensures that "any person skilled in the art'' of the
invention can read and understand the invention, so that after the expiration of the patent,
they will be able to make and use the invention themselves.
Thus, when a computer program meets those five requirements, it is patentable.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recently published the Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions'^*^ (the Guidelines) These Guidelines were
drafted in order to assist in the examination of computer-related applications.
2 - The Patent and Trademark Office's Examination Guidelinesfor Computer-Related
Inventions
The PTO issued the final Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
on February 28, 1996. These Guidelines were drafted to be fully consistent with binding
case law precedent.''^ However, the Guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking
and thus, do not have the force and effect of law.''^ The PTO Guidelines were developed
^'^ Merges. Menell. Lemley & Jordes. supra note 1. at 129.
^'^
Julie E. Cohens. Rexerse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic \igilantism: Intellectual Propert}'
Implications of "lock-out" Technologies. 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091. 1 178 (1995).
^"35U.S.C. $ 112.
''^ E.xamination Guidelines for Computer-Related In\entions. 61 Fed. Reg. 7.478 (1996) (efFectixe date
March 29. 1996). these Guidelines are final and replace the proposed Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Implemented Imentions. 60 Fed. Reg. 28. 778 (June 2. 1995) and the supporting legal analysis
issued on October 3. 1995.
^' PTO Guidelines, supra note, at 7.479.
'''
Id.
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to assist Office personnel in the examination of applications drawn to computer-related
inventions. The Guidelines assert different steps for examiners to follow.
First, examiners have to determine whether the statutory subject matter
requirements of 35 U.S.C. $ 101 are met by classifying the invention as one of the
statutory or non-statutory category of invention. The Guidelines specify the areas that are
considered non-statutory:
"Claims to computer-related inventions that are clearly non-statutory fall into the
same general categories as non-statutory claims in other parts, namely natural
phenomena such as magnetism, and abstract ideas or laws of nature which
constitute 'descriptive material'. Descriptive material can be characterized as
either 'flinctional descriptive material' or 'non-functional descriptive material In
this context, 'functional descriptive material' consists of data structures and
computer programs which impart functionality when encoded on a computer-
readable medium. 'Non-flinctional descriptive material' includes but is not limited
to music, literary works and a compilation or mere arrangement of data."''^
Then, the PTO Guidelines specify the types of statutory subject matter for computer-
related inventions. The Guidelines qualify software for patent protection both as a
machine and as a process. The first qualification protects software when claimed as part
of a computer. To be statutory, the claim must "define a useful machine or manufacture
by identifying the physical structure of the machine or manufacture in terms of its
hardware and software combination".'^" The second classification protects software when
claimed as a process. This classification reflects more closely the patenting of software
per se.' The statutory processes are those which consist of a series of one or more acts
that manipulate physical matter or energy resulting in some form of a physical
transformation.'^^ However, the PTO Guidelines do not condition patentability of a
process on physical transformation. The PTO Guidelines provide that physical
transformation "is not determinative of whether the process is statutory because such
^'^ PTO Guidelines, supra note 3 16. at 7. 481.
^-"
Id at 7. 482.
^"' Wayne M. Kennard. Obtaining and Litigating Soft\\are Patents and Protecting Software on the
Internet. 444 PLI/Pat 275. 288 (1996).
^-- PTO Guidelines, supra note 316. at 7. 483.
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transformation alone does not distinguish a statutory computer process from a non-
statutory computer process What is determinative is not how the computer performs the
process, but what the computer does to achieve a practical application".'"' Hence, a
process will be statutory where there is a practical application for the invention '^'
After this initial determination, examiners must analyze if the invention complies
with other statutory requirements of patentability (35 U.S.C. $ 102, 103, 112) The
determination of whether a claimed computer-related invention complies with 35 US C. $
102 &103 begins with a comparison to the prior art.'*^^ If no differences are found
between the claimed invention and the prior art, then the claimed invention is not novel
and must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. $ 102.'^^ But, once distinctions are identified
between the claimed invention and the prior art, these distinctions must be assessed and
resolved in light of the knowledge possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in
order to determine whether the new invention would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made.'^^ If the invention was non-obvious, then the requirement of 35
U.S.C. $ 103 has been satisfied.
Then, office personnel should examine if the claimed-invention complies with 35
U.S.C. $ 112 first and second paragraph. In order to satisfy the first paragraph, the
application must describe the invention in a manner that enables a person of ordinary skill
in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation.'^^ To satisfy the
second paragraph, the claim must define the invention in a manner consistent with the
applicant's written description of the invention.'"^^
However, it is important to note that staff members of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) issued comments on the Guidelines because they were concerned that
323 PTO Guidelines, supra note 316. at 7. 484.
^-' Id at 7. 486.
^-- Id at 7. 487.
3:6 j^
^-"
Id.
3:8 j^
^-' Id at 7. 486.
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the new Guidelines might result in the granting of overly broad software patent
'"'"
Therefore, the Guidelines should be used with precaution because they may have
anticompetitive effects resulting from the issuance of overbroad patent Moreover, even if
patent protection of software has some advantages over copyright law , it also has some
disadvantages.
3 - Advantages and disadvantages ofpatent protection ofsoftware
The patent application process involves substantial cost''' and time'"'", whereas
copyright protection begins with the creation of the software, and the copyright
registration is relatively inexpensive Moreover, copyright law provides for a longer term
of protection (the life of the author and fifty years) than patent law (formerly seventeen
years form the day of issues, and now twenty years from the day the patent application is
filled). Finally, copyright law provides for a large catalogue of remedies''', whereas in
patent law, it is even difficult to obtain a preliminary injunction when there is
factual dispute as to infringement or validity.'""*
Nevertheless, patent protection of software can be advantageous. Patent law
protects uncopyrightable fiinctional processes, systems and method embodied in the
software (as with trade secret). Thus patent and copyright law can co-exist which can be
extremely advantageous. In effect, copyright law, with its inexpensive, quicker and longer
protection can protect the expression of the underlying ideas in software while patent law
can protect the underlying ideas. Moreover, as with trade secret, there is no fair use
"" Aspen Law & Business, a Di\ision of Aspen Publishers. Inc.. PTO Issue Computer Imention Legal
Analysis. 7 NO. 1 1 J. Propnetan Rts. .^5. 36 (1995).
^^' There are three major costs that must be faced in preparing and prosecutmg a software patent
application. First, the cost for the preparation of the software application made b> the attome\ or an
agent. Second, the cost to prosecute the soft\vare patent application. Third, the cost for the prior art
searches so that the patent \\ont be held imalid.
"""
It lakes from 18 months to 2 years to obtain a patent. Unfortunately, the software area changes rapidh
and in the penod of time it takes to obtain a patent protection, a new software may be created and ma>
eclipse the patented software.
'^^ Such as nationwide injunction (17 U.S.C. $ 502) or confiscation of the infnnging work (17 U.S.C.
503) or damages and profits caused by the infringement (17 U.S.C. $ 504).
^^"'
Gofif. supra note 281. at 17.
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defense in patent law. Thus, there is no excuse for any infringing use of the patented
software Unlike trade secret, patent law protects the computer program without the need
to maintain secrecy. Finally, copyright law protects "'original work of authorship", thus, if
someone creates a similar software but which is an original work of authorship, there is no
copyright infringement. Whereas, once a patent is obtained, the protection does not have
to rely on whether or not the second software is original In eff'ect, patent law protects
against later works that are the same of substantially the same as the patented invention.'''
In conclusion, patent protection of software is advantageous because it provides a
coverage for processes and systems embodied in software. Therefore, both copyright and
patent protection for software are needed to provide a balanced system of intellectual
property protection for the different components of software."'"^
^^"^
Kennard. supra note 321. at 296.
"'^ Willis E. Higgins. The Case For Software Patent Protection. 14 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 3 15. 321
(1992)
CHAPTER VII
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OFSOFTWARE
With the development of new technologies, it is much easier to have a worldwide
access to copyrighted works such as computer software than before Therefore, the need
to protect software has reached international proportions. The following chapter, first,
describes the previous international copyright fi"amework of software, then, it examines
the recent Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Right that
provides protection for computer software.
A - Major International Copyright Conventions
The principal international fi-amework for the protection of intellectual property
consists of two international agreements, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works'"'^ (the Berne Convention) and the Universal Copyright
Convention'''^ (UCC). Some have referred to those two Conventions as "choice of law"
treaties, because rather than establishing a complete body of international rules for
copyright, those Conventions dictate what Member States' domestic law will apply to a
^^ Berne Convention for the Protection of Literar\ and Artistic Works of September 9. 1886. completed at
Paris on May 4. 1896. revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20. 1914,
revised at Rome on June 2, 1928. re\ised at Brussels on June 26. 1948. revised at Stockholm on July 14.
1967, and revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
"^ Universal Cop\Tight Convention signed in Geneva on September 6. 1952. 6 U.S.T. 2731. 216 U.N.T.S.
132, revised on Julv 24. 1971. 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
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given transnational infringement claim.
'"''^ The Berne Convention was first established in
1886 in Berne, Switzerland and was amended several times since then. With the passage
of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988'^", which restructured the American
law for the Berne Convention compliance, the United States officially entered the Berne
Convention on March 1, 1989. The United States adhered to the Paris Act of 1971, the
current text of the treaty. The Berne Convention is administered by the Worid Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO is a specialized agency within the United Nation
system and its role is to conduct studies and provide services designed to facilitate
protection of intellectual property. The second international agreement, the UCC, was
signed in 1952 in Geneva, Switzerland and took effect in the United States in 1955. The
UCC is administered by UNESCO, a United Nation agency.
Those two international conventions do not define precisely what works fall within
their protection.'"*' Nevertheless, software appears to be protectable under both
conventions. In effect, article 2 of the Berne Convention provides a non-exclusive list of
examples of literary and artistic works. '"'^ Thus, even if article 2 does not mention
computer software, "the absence of limits on expression may be taken as an explicit
confirmation of the fact that the machine-readable computer program is a work protected
under the convention".""*' Moreover, computer software can reasonably be considered as
^^^ Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg. Copyright for the Nineties 878 (1993).
^"'Pub.L. No. 100-568(1988).
^"*' The Berne Comention. supra note 337. An. 2 stales that "the expression "literary and artistic works'
shall include ever> production in the literar> . scientific and artistic domain, \vhate\er may be the mode or
form of its expression..."; The Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 338. Art. I states that "Each
Contracting Slate undertakes to provide for the adequate and efifecti\ e protection of the rights of authors
and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings..."'.
^''The Berne Con\enlion. supra note 337. Art. 2 pro\ides that literar> and artistic works include " books.
pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses works; choreographic works and entertainments in
dumb show; musical compositions with or w ithout words; cinematographic works to w hich are
assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting.
architecture, sculpture, engra\ing and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works
expressed by a process analogous to photograph\ ; works of applied art; illustration maps, plans, sketches
and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science."
^^^ Manfred Kindermann. Computer Soft\vare and Copyright Con\entions. 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
6,8(1981).
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a scientific writing and thus, according to article I of the UCC, can be subject to
protection under UCC."'
Both the Berne Convention and the UCC provide for national treatment '"*' It
means that signatory countries will provide the same rights to non-nationals from other
member countries as to their own nationals. National treatment, however, is problematic
for the protection of computer software. In effect, the rights of computer developers will
var>' with the country in which enforcement is sought. Even if the country in which the
enforcement is sought is a member of one of the two International Copyright Conventions,
this country may not protect computer software.'"*^ Therefore, the national treatment
could be a disadvantage for foreign computer developers.
Both the Berne Convention and the UCC provide a long term of protection. The
Berne Convention provides for a term of protection equal to the life of the author plus
fifty years.
'*^ The UCC provides for a twenty-five years term of protection measured
from the date of the author's death." Some authors argue that those terms of protection
are too long because a long term of protection 'is not acceptable for useflil works, such as
computer software, because the public has a strong interest in having access to usefiil
works''.'"*^ Moreover, the rapid rate of development industry results in computer software
^^^ Marie-Francoise Gilbert. Comment. International Copyright Law Applied to Computer Programs in
the United States and France. 14 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 105. 109-10 (1982).
^^^ The Berne Convention . supra note 337. Art. 3(1 )(a) states that "The protection of this Convention
shall apply to: (a) authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works, whether
published or not..." and art. 5(1) adds that "Authors shall enjo>. in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Con\ention. in countries of the Union other than the countr\ of origin, the rights
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially
granted by this Convention.", The Uni\ersal Copyright Co\ention. supra note 338. Art. II states that
"Published works of nationals of any Contracting State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the
same protection as that other State accords to works of its national first published in its own territor> ...".
"'^ Robert A. Arena, A Proposal for the International Intellectual Propert> Protection of Computer
Software. 14 U. Pa. J. Intl Bus. L. 213. 229 (1993).
^"^ The Berne Convention, supra note 337. Art. 7(1).
^^'^ The Universal Copyright Comention. supra note 338. Art. IV (2)(a).
^^' Arena, supra note 346. at 224.
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becoming obsolete and with a little commercial value by the time the copyright term of
protection expires.'^^
As neither the Berne Convention nor the UCC specifically provide a protection for
computer software, the international community included this issue in the round of
negotiations under the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
completed on December 15, 1993.
B - The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Propert\ Rights
(TRIPS)
1 - The copyright protection ofsoftyvare under the TRIPs Agreement
In December 1993, the members of the GATT concluded the Uruguay Round
negotiations. It incorporates an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights'^' (TRIPs). One of the issues faced by the Uruguay Round negotiators
was how to treat computer software.
Part II of the TRIPs Agreement addresses each intellectual property right in
succession. It explicitly grants copyright protection to software. Art 10(1) of the
Agreement ensures that "computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971)".'^^ Therefore, software
copyright owners from GATT countries are guaranteed to receive certain standard rights
and protections regardless of their nationality."'^"'
Moreover, article 1 1 of the Agreement states that "in respect of . . . computer
programs ..., Member shall provide authors and their successors in title the right to
authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their
^^" Arena, supra note 346. at 225.
^'^ Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Final Texts of the GATT
Uruguay Round Agreements Including the Agreements Establishing the World Trade Organization.
Annex IC. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, available in LEXIS. INTLAW Librar>. GATT File.
^-'- TRIPs. supra note. Art 10(1).
^"^ Da\ id Zimmerman. Global Limits on "Look and Feel"": Defining the Scope of Software Copyright
Protection by International Agreement. 34 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 503. 504 (1996).
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copyrighted works... "."'^* Thus, the TRIPs Agreement provides the same kind of rights as
the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, it prohibits the rental of
computer software without the expHcit authorization of the copyright owner.
However, the TRIPs Agreement does not resolve all the problem for an
international copyright protection of software.
2 - Disadvantages ofthe TRIPs Agreement
First of all. the TRIPs Agreement provides little guidance about the scope of
protection to be afforded to non-literal elements of software.'^' Article 9(2) of the
Agreement states that '"copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas,
procedures, method of operation or mathematical concepts as much".'^^ Nevertheless,
this provision does little more than restate the problem that American courts faced on how
to differentiate the idea in software from the copyrightable expression.'" Therefore,
similarly as the Agreement states copyright protection for literal element of software'^^, it
should provide more guidance on how its signatory countries shall define the scope of
protection given to non-literal elements of software.
Second, the TRIPs Agreement, like the Berne Convention and the UCC, provides
for national treatment. '^^ Therefore, similarly as for the Berne Convention and the UCC,
such a provision is a disadvantage for foreign computer developers because their rights
will depend with the country in which enforcement is sought.
Third, the TRIPs Agreement provides a long term of protection. Article 12 of the
Agreement provides for a fifty years term of protection measured from the publication or
the making of the work.'^*^ Thus, the term of protection, unlike the Berne Convention or
354 jRips. supra note 351. An 11.
35
356
^ Zimmerman, supra note 353. at 510.
TRIPs. supra note 351. Art 9(2).
"^"^ Zimmerman, supra note 353. at 510.
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-pRips supra note 351. Art 10(1).
^'"^ See id Art 3 which provides that "each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less fa\ ourable than that it accords to its o\\ n nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual propert>..."
36.. YRjps supra no^e 35 ^ ^rt 12.
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the UCC, is not calculated on a basis of the life of the author Some authors think that this
term of protection is too long for computer software.' ' In effect, these authors argue that
"because the development of computer software usually parallels the development of new
microprocessors, which are covered by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act'''"
(SCPA), the term of protection for computer software should be no longer than that
granted to semiconductor mask works, which is ten years under the SCPA"
"'^'
Finally, there are some disadvantages to leaving intellectual property issues in the
GATT negotiations instead of leaving it to WIPO. First of all, WIPO is a special agency
of the United Nations which is specialized in the protection of intellectual property.
Therefore, the negotiators of GATT do not have the expertise of WIPO negotiators.'^"*
Thus, it seems more appropriate to leave intellectual property issues to WIPO instead of
risking to duplicate its effort through the GATT system. '^^ Moreover, WIPO expressed
some concern that TRIPs Agreement might threaten the ultimate stability of the
international copyright system built up, over more than a century, within the framework of
the Berne Convention. '^^ Notwithstanding those arguments, it is important to notice that
GATT's framework of negotiations is greater than WIPO's. Therefore, parties can
compromise on more issues within the GATT, which increases the chance of success for
an international copyright protection.
"'^^
In conclusion, there are some serious advantages to leaving intellectual property
within the GATT where negotiations are easier. However, the TRIPs Agreement should
^''' A fift} > ears term of protection for software is too long because computer programs occur at hight rate
and a \ersion of a program will become obsolete in a relatively short period of time and no longer warrant
protection (Arena, supra note 346).
^^- 17 U.S.C. $$901-914(1988).
^" Arena, supra note 346. at 235.
^^ Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang. Report on the Second Ringberg S>Tnposium. in GATT of WIPO? New
Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Propert>. 1. 32 (Friednch-Karl Beier &. Gerhard
Schricker eds.. 1989).
'''
Id.
^^ Craig Joyce. William Patr>. Marshall LeafFer and Peter Jaszi. Copyright Law. third edition at 1007
(1997).
^^ Joos & Moofang. supra note 364. at 35.
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define the scope of copyright protection for non-literal elements of software It also
should provide for uniform treatment of computer software by members instead of a
national treatment And finally, it should reduce the term of protection which is too long
regarding computer programs
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Millions of dollars are spent every year on research and development to advance
software technology. The software industry continues to grow and become increasingly
important in the United States.
Copyright protection continues to be an important weapon available to software
developers in order to protect their interests. Nevertheless, some changes should be made
to the copyright law in order to improve software protection while retaining the current
fi^amework. First of all, the existing fi'amework designed to help with the distinctions
between idea and expression, protected and unprotected elements, is elusive and hazy.
Some authors argue that software copyright provides too much protection Hence, they
propose to limit copyright to just protecting against the direct copying of code without
protecting non-literal elements of software at all.' Such a position, however, is extremist
because the copyright protection of program's structure and organization is well
established. Nevertheless, courts and Congress should resolve the problem of the
protection of non-literal elements of software by defining the scope of protection given to
those non-literal elements. Then, Congress should give some guidance on how to
interpret the phrase "owner of a copy of a computer program" used in section 11 7 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. In effect, its ambiguity creates problem for the application of the
section. Finally, reverse engineering of computer software where it is necessary to
develop compatible programs should be allowed. In effect, such a process seems to fall
368 Graham & Zerbe. Jr.. supra note 142. at 139.
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under the fair use exception and thus, is not an infringement of copyright law. Moreover,
copyright owners would still have sufficient measures of protection under copyright law
without the prohibition of reverse engineering.
It is also important to note that some authors argue that copyright law gives too
much rights to copyright owners of software, as for example with the new Computer
Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990. This act modified the first sale doctrine in an
attempt to reduce the illegal duplication of software. However, there is no real evidence
that such a limitation will benefit the public by preventing the erosion of software
developers' ability to sell."'^^ Nevertheless, Congress should not forget that the central
theme of copyright law is to provide the public with access to creative works. Therefore,
Congress should be careful to balance the incentive to create and the desire to provide
public access to works.
Since software is both literary and technological, other forms of protection are
appropriate for it. Trade secret is an effective protection that can co-exist with copyright
protection. However, the requirement to prove and maintain the secrecy is difficult to
fulfill. Since recently, software are expressly protectable by patent law and the patent
protection is advantageous for the protection of software. Therefore, both copyright and
patent protection are needed to provide a balance system of intellectual property
protection for the different elements of software.'^"
As for the international protection of software, it is advantageous to leave the
protection of software within the GATT because its framework of negotiations is greater
than the WIPO's. Nevertheless, the TRIPs Agreement should, first, define the scope of
copyright protection for non-literal elements of software. Second, it should provide for
uniform treatment of computer software by members instead of a national treatment. And
finally, the TRIPs Agreement should reduce the term of protection which is too long
^^^ Corsello. supra note 210. at 208.
^ " Higgins. supra note 336. at 321.
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regarding software. Some authors argue that the term of protection should be no longer
than ten years, which is the term of protection granted to semiconductor chip.'^'
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